## Advertising

Marchal wrote: > But the entire UDA TE shows that the mind-body problem is > reduced to extracting the physical laws for the measure > on that indeterminacy. This explain at least the philosophical > shape of QM. OK > [BM] And it shows that COMP entails SE is SE is correct. It shows that COMP entails the general shape of SE but not SE proper. > [BM] I also use the COMP hypothesis which help by giving both TEs, and > precise mathematical theories. It is frequent that focusing on point > and focusing on links are related by dualities. With the Z logics the > links are really topological. I think I have shown a way to derive > the thickness from the turing-tropic views. I don't understand, but if you actually found a way to derive the "thickness" ( which I guess is Planck's constant) from purely philosophical arguments, you deserve a Nobel Prize. However, until I see the proof, I strongly doubt that you have achieved such a feat. > [GL] > The important thing is only the current state of the observer(s). > >The extensions to the observer are fuzzy. > > [BM] But they are relatively real and why not consider them > important too especially when one want understand the > laws of physics from them. > The set of consistent extensions is perhaps fuzzy, but they are > mathematically well defined (with some assumptions). > Right, I think we are now in agreement! The key words are CONSISTENT extensions. This means that a consciousness can be fuzzy... and the world it lives in... or rather each world (in the whole set of worlds it lives in) must be a CONSISTENT extension of this consciousness. The degree of the consciousness fuzziness corresponds to the size of the set of worlds. The word "consistent" implies logical consistency where logic is in relation to the consciousness of the observer. > [GL] >Precisely. With respect to us!. We are the machine....it's a vicious > >circle...we > >are self emergent...Not only is our world anthropically defined, but we > >ourselves > >also are.... > > [BM] Turing-tropic instead. That the simple shift I do. There is a nice > mathematical way to interview the self introspecting honest machine. > (BTW and by Solovay there are *two* nice utterly non trivial ways). > I don't understand Turing-tropic > [GL] >Your use of the words "shared histories" partially seem to carry some old > >fashioned baggage from the days when time was thought to be linear. > >Yet you do accept the concept of bifurcation and merging... > > [BM] I don't understand. The guys after the self-duplication in W M share their > life stories until the duplication. I talk of sharing because of bifurcation,and > merging. No they don't share life stories. They share *memories* of life stories. Memories, true or false are PRESENT properties of their mind. This is why I rather assume a first order Markov process, which does not depends on past information. > [GL] >Can conventional mechanics support consciousness spliting and merging? I > >don't think so. > > [BM] That would just mean conventional mechanics is incompatible with comp. > That is quite possible. QM *is* compatible with comp, perhaps even > a consequence. We agree > >The point is that merging seems to be possible but splitting is difficult. > [GL] >You could have splitting of consciousness, if, instead of considering > >consciousness as > >a single point represented by definite states, you are willing to consider > >a fuzzy region comprised of a multitude of points. > > [BM] This is exactly what happen with comp. Consciousness is represented by > the set of all consistent extensions. That gives, it seems, the right > "fuzzy region". > Ok, I think we agree now... I was mistaken in thinking that COMP was a pure mechanistic view. In fact if we add the condition of fuzziness to the mechanistic view of consciousness together with the idea of *consistent* extensions, then we can have have indeterminacy, splitting and merging. Fuzziness does not have to be explicitely defined. Rather it is the LACK of definition of a conscious state that allows a NUMBER of CONSISTENT extensions. > [GL] >Bruno's assumption that indeterminacy can be deduced from > >COMP is faulty. I retract this statement. George