Nick Bostrom's uses  the self-sampling assumption without simultaneously
invoking the self-indicating assumption. That's wrong and leads
straightforward to nonsense.

E.g. the Doomsday argument is a closely related fallacy. This is explained
by Ken Olum:

General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology, abstract
gr-qc/0009081
From: Ken D. Olum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date (v1): Fri, 22 Sep 2000 19:14:23 GMT   (19kb)
Date (revised v2): Fri, 13 Oct 2000 19:28:53 GMT   (20kb)

The doomsday argument and the number of possible observers
Authors: Ken D. Olum
Comments: 18 pages, revtex, 1 postscript figure with epsf; add application
to quantum cosmology
Subj-class: General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology; Data Analysis,
Statistics and Probability; Physics and Society
Journal-ref: Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002) 164-184


If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born
at a fairly typical time in history of humanity. On the other hand, if
humanity lasts for much longer and trillions of people eventually exist,
then we have been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all
people. According to the Doomsday Argument of Carter, Leslie, Gott, and
Nielsen, this means that the chance of a disaster which would obliterate
humanity is much larger than usually thought. Here I argue that treating
possible observers in the same way as those who actually exist avoids this
conclusion. Under this treatment, it is more likely to exist at all in a
race which is long-lived, as originally discussed by Dieks, and this cancels
the Doomsday Argument, so that the chance of a disaster is only what one
would ordinarily estimate. Treating possible and actual observers alike also
allows sensible anthropic predictions from quantum cosmology, which would
otherwise depend on one's interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Paper: PostScript (600 dpi), or Other formats
(N.B.: delivery types and potential problems)
refers to , cited by


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----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
Van: "Brian Scurfield" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Verzonden: zaterdag 13 april 2002 10:19
Onderwerp: Re: Holodeck guy tries to prove 'Bruno theory'


> Bruno and Gordon: Your debate is an interesting one. I'm not exactly sure
who to side with but I think I favour Gordon's side of the debate. Nick the
hologuy is in a bit of a pickle: he can't work out whether he is in a
simulation or not. For whichever way he turns the simulation will fool him.
He doesn't know whether he is physical or metaphysical! To stir the pot a
little let me refer both of you to this paper:
>
> http://www.simulation-argument.com/classic.html
>
> where self sampling assumptions are used to argue the case that it is a
real possibility that all of us now are in a simulation. The last chapter of
FoR also seems to indicate the same for if such civilizations exist then why
don't find ourselves existing among them? Well maybe we are, but we are in a
simulation being run by them. I don't really believe this, but is it in fact
true that we could never know it (unless the simulators wanted us to)? As a
programmer I have to question this. My simulations always contain lots of
bugs and I'm never really sure if they're bug free. Nick our hologuy would,
however, be sure to eventually notice them because he has to live in my
world. Also my simulations always have artificial boundary conditions
imposed by the fact that I have to run them on finite machines and these
boundaries would show up in Nick's investigations and as ad-hoc add-ons in
his theories. Although my simulation program could edit the contents of his
brain, a resourceful intelligent autonomous being like Nick could probably
find ways to trick the program. Are bug-free simulations with no artificial
boundary conditions really possible?
>
> Brian


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