Dear Wei:

I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the 
concept of a decision.

I see either a global computational arrival at a next state from the 
current state or a transition to a next state that is at least partially 
the result of information received from an external random oracle.

I see both of these types of universes as essential in the ensemble and 
also that they both randomly convert into their opposite type.

Neither seems to support the idea of decision dependent arrivals at a next 
state.   Further any illusion of a selection of a next state to be 
transitioned to is already the next state which must have been either 
computationally or noisily arrived at.

Hal



At 4/17/02, you wrote:
>How many people here share my interest in decision theory as it relates to
>the all universes hypothesis? I recently found two papers that seem
>relevant:
>
>---
>
>http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~blipman/Papers/axiom.pdf
>
>Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework
>for Bounded Rationality
>
>Barton L. Lipman
>
>I propose modeling boundedly rational agents as agents who are not
>logically omniscient ó that is, who do not know all logical or
>mathematical implications of what they know. I show how a subjective state
>space can be derived as part of a subjective expected utility
>representation of the agentís preferences. The representation exists under
>very weak conditions. The representation uses the familiar language of
>probability, utility, and states of the world in the hope that this makes
>this model of bounded rationality easier to use in applications.
>
>---
>
>http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9906015
>
>Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions
>
>David Deutsch
>
>The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally
>obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary
>because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the
>remaining, non-probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the
>non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory.
>
>---
>
>I would like to discuss these papers if anyone else is interested.

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