Your approaches seem incoherent to me. If the universe is defined by a complete computable description then that description includes you and whatever decision process your brain implements. To treat the universe as computable and your choices as determined by some utility function and decision theory is contradictory.
Brent Meeker "There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. There is another theory which states that this has already happened." --- Douglas Adams On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote: > On Wed, Apr 17, 2002 at 08:36:29PM -0700, H J Ruhl wrote: > > I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the > > concept of a decision. > > I was also having the problem of figuring out how to make sense of the > concept of a decision. My current philosophy is that you can have > preferences about what happens in a number of universes, where each > universe is defined by a complete mathematical description (for example an > algorithm with no inputs for computing that universe). So you could say "I > wish this event would occur in the universe computed by algorithm A, and > that event would occur in the universe computed by algorithm B." Whether > or not those events actually do occur is mathematically determined, but if > you are inside those universes, parts of their histories computationally > or logically depend on your actions. In that case you're in principle > unable to compute your own choices from the description of the universe, > and you also can't compute any events that depend on your choices. That > leaves you free to say "If I do X the following will occur in universes A > and B" even if it is actually mathematically impossible for you to do X in > universes A and B. You can then make whatever choice best satisfies your > preferences. Decision theory is then about how to determine which choice > is best. > > That's the normative approach. The positive approach is the following. > Look at the parts of the multiverse that we can see observe or simulate. > How can we explain or predict the behavior of intelligent beings in the > observable/simulatable multiverse? One way is to present a model of > decision theory and show that most intelligent beings we observed or > simulated follow the model. We can also justify the model by showing that > if those beings did not behave the way the model says they should, we > would not been able to observe or simulate them (for example because they > would have been evolutionarily unsuccessful). > >