Lennart Nilsson wrote:
>I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information
>transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an
>information transfer without physicalness.
OK, but then you postulate something physical exists.
>"Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's
>'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology
>and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical
>representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover
>arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001
I appreciate very much Zurek, but like almost all physicist he does
postulate physicalness. I do not, if only because I would like an
explanation of "physicalness" without reference to physical being.
Also I showed that such reference cannot be used once we postulate
the computationalist hypothesis (comp)in the cognitive science.
Consult my URL for more explanations including discussions in this list.
I am aware what I say is quite against the current paradigm, although
this is a point where a lot agrees (in this list), including Juergen
Schmidhuber whose work is also based on comp. The difference between
Schmidhuber and me is that Juergen search prior for the "right" computation
among all computations, and I search a (relative) measure on all computations.
But we are both trying to explain physical appearances from the
"every computations exists" where a computation is basically a collection
of relatively related numbers (not an "actual running of a concrete