I might not be on the same side as you and Juergen Schmidhuber on this, but I AM on the same side as David Deutsch which is comforting.....

"Recent progress in the quantum theory of computation has provided practical > instances of this, and > forces us to abandon the classical view that computation, and hence > mathematical proof, are purely logical notions > independent of that of computation as a physical process. Henceforward, a > proof must be regarded not as an abstract object > or process but as a physical process, a species of computation" >From David Deutsch's paper: Machines, Logic and Quantum Physics (http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/math.HO/9911150) ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Lennart Nilsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 3:16 PM Subject: Re: Isn't this a good point > Lennart Nilsson wrote: > > >I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information > >transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an > >information transfer without physicalness. > > > OK, but then you postulate something physical exists. > > > >"Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's > >'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology > >and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical > >representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover > >'familiar reality'." > >arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001 > > > I appreciate very much Zurek, but like almost all physicist he does > postulate physicalness. I do not, if only because I would like an > explanation of "physicalness" without reference to physical being. > Also I showed that such reference cannot be used once we postulate > the computationalist hypothesis (comp)in the cognitive science. > Consult my URL for more explanations including discussions in this list. > > I am aware what I say is quite against the current paradigm, although > this is a point where a lot agrees (in this list), including Juergen > Schmidhuber whose work is also based on comp. The difference between > Schmidhuber and me is that Juergen search prior for the "right" computation > among all computations, and I search a (relative) measure on all computations. > But we are both trying to explain physical appearances from the > "every computations exists" where a computation is basically a collection > of relatively related numbers (not an "actual running of a concrete > machine". > > Bruno > > -- > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/