I might not be on the same side as you and Juergen
Schmidhuber on this, but I AM on the same side as David Deutsch which is

"Recent progress in the quantum theory of computation has provided practical
> instances of this, and
> forces us to abandon the classical view that computation, and hence
> mathematical proof, are purely logical notions
> independent of that of computation as a physical process. Henceforward, a
> proof must be regarded not as an abstract object
> or process but as a physical process, a species of computation"

>From David Deutsch's paper: Machines, Logic
and Quantum Physics (http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/math.HO/9911150)

----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Lennart Nilsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 3:16 PM
Subject: Re: Isn't this a good point

> Lennart Nilsson wrote:
> >I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information
> >transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an
> >information transfer without physicalness.
> OK, but then you postulate something physical exists.
> >"Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of
> >'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between
> >and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical
> >representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to
> >'familiar reality'."
> >arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001
> I appreciate very much Zurek, but like almost all physicist he does
> postulate physicalness. I do not, if only because I would like an
> explanation of "physicalness" without reference to physical being.
> Also I showed that such reference cannot be used once we postulate
> the computationalist hypothesis (comp)in the cognitive science.
> Consult my URL for more explanations including discussions in this list.
> I am aware what I say is quite against the current paradigm, although
> this is a point where a lot agrees (in this list), including Juergen
> Schmidhuber whose work is also based on comp. The difference between
> Schmidhuber and me is that Juergen search prior for the "right"
> among all computations, and I search a (relative) measure on all
> But we are both trying to explain physical appearances from the
> "every computations exists" where a computation is basically a collection
> of relatively related numbers (not an "actual running of a concrete
> machine".
> Bruno
> --
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Reply via email to