At 22:46 -0700 8/07/2002, Hal Finney wrote:
>If my mind, as a physical or computational system, is instantiated
>in multiple places, whether multiple universes, multiple branches of a
>many-worlds interpretation (MWI), or even multiple places and times in one
>universe, the question is how that appears to me from the first-person
>perspective. I am adopting a position that from my point of view, it
>is indeterminate which of those instantiations I am now experiencing.
>There is no "fact of the matter" as to which one is me, now.
>The alternative is to say that although all of these instantiations
>are in some sense indistinguishable, nevertheless the instances of
>consciousness produced by these systems are all distinct. That is, for
>each instance of consciousness, there is a single physical system which
>creates that consciousness. All of the physical systems are similar, or
>even locally identical, so that the consciousness instances produced are
>all structurally the same. But nevertheless we would not say that there
>is one consciousness which spans all the implementations; rather, there
>are multiple consciousnesses which merely "look alike from the inside".
>Anyway, that is the opposite of the view I am taking for the purposes
>of this discussion. I am assuming the former position, that my present
>consciousness is being instantiated widely throughout the multiverse
>and I can with equal justification think that I am experiencing any
>of those instantiations.
Or even, perhaps, that "I am experiencing" all instantiations at once.
Eventually it will be the relative proportion of differentiating
(or bifurcating) history-instantiations which should count.
>My consciousness, in that sense, spans many
>parts of the multiverse, and the question of "which universe am I in"
>has no unique answer.
I would even say that the question is meaningless. It is not clear that
all "my" possible experiences can be associate with "well defined universe".
I think I agree with Hal Finney. Hal, do you defend this position or was it
only for the purpose of the discussion. Have you a definite opinion?
Wei, I hope my way of talking yesterday didn't seem too rude. I am really
trying hard to understand what you don't understand about the necessity
to take into account the comp 1-indeterminacy in TOE, once comp is postulated
(comp = Church thesis + minimal amount of arithmetical realism + there is
a level of self-description such that my private experience doesn't change
for functional substitutions made at that level).