Saibal Mitra wrote:

>MWI is a fully deterministic theory, but it is not the >only deterministic theory consistent with QM. > >I believe that 't Hooft's theory is more natural from the point of view that >universes are programs. I don't believe that universes are programs. If comp is true, first person universes emerges from the "running" of infinities of programs. Universes are first person plural (sharable) anticipations on infinitely many computations. >It is hard for me to understand how you get >interference between ``nearby´´ universes or programs. According to 't Hooft >QM would arise in a ``single universe´´ Indeterminacy, form of non locality, and (more general a priori) interferences appear eventually in the possible (consistent) discourses of (collection) of machines anticipating their most probable relative computational histories. For example, interference *appears* when machine cannot distinguish histories which -diverge below their comp level of substitution, and -converge above. (Compare with the two slits). Would experiments confirms 't Hooft, my work shows only that this would falsify comp. and most probably QM (which could follow from comp). I have no problems with that. ("sets of interfering observable and rememorable histories" is a consequence of comp). Open problem; showing those interference behaves like waves. (A logical clue is my 1994 result showing that the arithmatical (godelian) "measure one" on those histories follows a non trivial sort of quantum logic). Bruno