Saibal Mitra wrote:

>MWI is a fully deterministic theory, but it is not the
>only deterministic theory consistent with QM.
>I believe that 't Hooft's theory is more natural from the point of view that
>universes are programs.

I don't believe that universes are programs. If comp is true, first person
universes emerges from the "running" of infinities of programs.
Universes are first person plural (sharable) anticipations on infinitely
many computations.

>It is hard for me to understand how you get
>interference between ``nearby´´ universes or programs. According to 't Hooft
>QM would arise in a ``single universe´´

Indeterminacy, form of non locality, and (more general a priori)
interferences appear eventually in the possible (consistent)
discourses of (collection) of machines anticipating their most probable
relative computational histories. For example, interference *appears* when
machine cannot distinguish histories which  -diverge below their comp
level of substitution, and  -converge above. (Compare with the two slits).

Would experiments confirms 't Hooft, my work shows only that this 
would falsify comp.
and most probably QM (which could follow from comp). I have no 
problems with that.
("sets of interfering observable and rememorable histories" is a 
consequence of comp).

Open problem; showing those interference behaves like waves. (A logical clue
is my 1994 result showing that the arithmatical (godelian) "measure 
one" on those
histories follows a non trivial sort of quantum logic).


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