At 18:40 +0100 19/07/2002, Gordon ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
wrote:
> Everett was not center around mind either ask David about (I believe)
> his 1977
> conversation with Everett in which he said his theory was Manyworlds and
> NOT many minds!
Yes but remember the remark he made about the mouse being
multiplied, not
the universe, at least not at once, but only at the speed of
decoherence
(in modern talk).
My own interpretation of QM is better described by
"Many-Worlds".
In particular I don't appreciate Albert-Loewer many-minds because
they
are obliged to postulate the probabilities.
Now David Deutsch use the comp hypothesis explicitly, and, unless
I have
been wrong comp entails that the laws of physics originates from
what the
consistent (immaterial) machines/programs/relative-numbers are
able to anticipate correctly.
There is no magic there, just "Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence" +
some amount of arithmetical platonism. (Very well defended by
David also).
Mind object are just object like the game of Bridge, numbers,
programs,
software, and plausibly quarks and gluons too ...
I would say every sentences in FOR is compatible with comp, but
most of
them are deducible from a deeper theory which is just number
theory +
inside views captured by the logic of incompleteness phenomena
and variants.
The main point is that with comp I don't see how such a move is
avoidable.
I will try to write a longer and clearer English paper.
I insist I am not a defender of the comp hypothesis. I am just
telling to
those who believes in the comp hyp, that the mind body problem
is, for them,
twice as much difficult than usually thought. This because with
comp you need
not only to solve the qualia/consciousness problem but also the
problem of the
origin of empirical laws. This is not obvious!
Then I show also that comp + modern math gives non trivial hints
for both part.
> Beside I thought you said your theory had nothing to do with
QM,sounds
> alot like you are trying to give a interpretation to it to me?
I just show that with the comp hyp Physics need to redefined as
the study
of a---hard to make precise (it's part of the MP
problem)---measure on all
computations. In fact with comp we will redo all physical
discoveries
in the reverse direction. Comp gives first a machine psychology
then many
histories "interpretation", then it should gives
gravitations, then weak force, then eventually electro-magnetism ...
(perhaps in ten centuries).
From the comp view the classical Poisson part of physics will be
the hardest
part to derive., and then geometry ... (I speculate a little bit
here but it
is to give an idea).
Of course we can dig on the two sides: machine psychology
(eternal
self reference logic and variants) and human evolving physics;
why not?
Hoping you are not too much confused, (I am also confused!, but
it is too
early to pretend comp refuted, and with comp the psycho/physico
reversal is
not an idea: it is a theorem(*)).
Regards, Bruno
(*) if someone find a flaw or even imprecisions I would be
grateful
letting me know it. (links
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html )
--
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/