At 18:40 +0100 19/07/2002, Gordon ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> Everett was not center around mind either ask David about (I believe)
> his 1977
> conversation with Everett in which he said his theory was Manyworlds and
> NOT many minds!
Yes but remember the remark he made about the mouse being multiplied, not
the universe, at least not at once, but only at the speed of decoherence
(in modern talk).
My own interpretation of QM is better described by "Many-Worlds".
In particular I don't appreciate Albert-Loewer many-minds because they
are obliged to postulate the probabilities.
Now David Deutsch use the comp hypothesis explicitly, and, unless I have
been wrong comp entails that the laws of physics originates from what the
consistent (immaterial) machines/programs/relative-numbers are able to anticipate correctly.
There is no magic there, just "Theoretical Artificial Intelligence" +
some amount of arithmetical platonism. (Very well defended by David also).
Mind object are just object like the game of Bridge, numbers, programs,
software, and plausibly quarks and gluons too ...
I would say every sentences in FOR is compatible with comp, but most of
them are deducible from a deeper theory which is just number theory +
inside views captured by the logic of incompleteness phenomena and variants.
The main point is that with comp I don't see how such a move is avoidable.
I will try to write a longer and clearer English paper.
I insist I am not a defender of the comp hypothesis. I am just telling to
those who believes in the comp hyp, that the mind body problem is, for them,
twice as much difficult than usually thought. This because with comp you need
not only to solve the qualia/consciousness problem but also the problem of the
origin of empirical laws. This is not obvious!
Then I show also that comp + modern math gives non trivial hints for both part.
> Beside I thought you said your theory had nothing to do with QM,sounds
> alot like you are trying to give a interpretation to it to me?
I just show that with the comp hyp Physics need to redefined as the study
of a---hard to make precise (it's part of the MP problem)---measure on all
computations. In fact with comp we will redo all physical discoveries
in the reverse direction. Comp gives first a machine psychology then many
histories "interpretation", then it should gives gravitations, then weak force, then eventually electro-magnetism ... (perhaps in ten centuries).
From the comp view the classical Poisson part of physics will be the hardest
part to derive., and then geometry ... (I speculate a little bit here but it
is to give an idea).
Of course we can dig on the two sides: machine psychology (eternal
self reference logic and variants) and human evolving physics; why not?
Hoping you are not too much confused, (I am also confused!, but it is too
early to pretend comp refuted, and with comp the psycho/physico reversal is
not an idea: it is a theorem(*)).
(*) if someone find a flaw or even imprecisions I would be grateful
letting me know it. (links http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html )