The very act of predicting what you will choose is equivalent to generating you virtually and observing what box you will choose. So, when you stand in front of the two boxes, you don't know if you are in the real world or in the virtual world. The causal argument is thus invalid.
The only way to beat the (imperfect) experimenter is to try to guess if you are in the real world or in the virtual world and choose A if you think that you are in the virtual world and choose A and B if you think that you are in the real world. If the probability that your guess is right is p, then this strategy will yield on average P*(10^3 + 10^6) dollars. So you need to be more than 99.9% sure about your whereabouts. This suggest that the a perfect simulation of someones brain generates a virtual reality with a relative measure of 50%. Saibal ----- Oorspronkelijk bericht ----- Van: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Verzonden: dinsdag 23 juli 2002 23:49 Onderwerp: Newcomb's paradox > I took the liberty of copying a few paragraphs from James Joyce's > book describing the causalist argument in Newcomb's Paradox. This is > the best statement of the argument for taking both boxes that I have > seen. I also included a short response of my own, which describes an > alternate way of viewing the paradox based on multiverse models. > It is at http://www.finney.org/~hal/Newcomb.html. > > Hal Finney > >