At 14:16 +1200 30/07/2002, Brian Scurfield wrote:
>So if the state I am in now is fungible with the state of myself in a future
>simulation it does make sense to ask whether I am here in the real world now
>(if that is where I am) or in the future simulation: I am in both places
>simultaneously. That's very weird! And I'm sure there must be some very
>strange implications.

One implication is that physics becomes a branch of machine's psychology.
Physical realities emerge as coherent sharable, and recoverable machine's
dreams (with dream = first person view of infinities of fungible 
computations). Hoping not being too much provocative. It is still 
possible
that those dreams are too numerous in which case comp could be refuted.


At 14:16 +1200 30/07/2002, Brian Scurfield wrote:
>And I *am* mathematics incarnate? (I'm still getting to grips with your
>interesting Universal Dovetailer argument and would appreciate some
>elaboration on why you think the UD doesn't need a hardware implementation).


To answer this would answer also Lennart Nilsson's "How can an abstraction
be felt?"

I think that the adjective "concrete" is an indexical, like "modern", "now",
"here", etc. It is also relative (like all indexicals).

Those who accept the many idea (even without comp) can considered the
abstract type <me/my-neighborhood>, or the more general couple
<subject/object>. Those are embedded in the abstract many-computations,
or block-multiverse. They appeared as concrete from the inside, but that is
only a first person view. Take the abstract UD living in numberland, how could
an inhabitant "inside" knows he is just an "abstraction in front of other
abstraction".

Bruno

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