On 31-Aug-02, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Dear Bruno,

>    Interleaving. ;-)

> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 5:40 AM
> Subject: Re: MIND and MATTER

>> Dear Stephen,

>>> I only have the vaguest hand waving reasoning at this
>> time but let me
>>> try to make my case as to why I asked that question. If
>> we identify
>> > with the notion of a "physical system" simulatable by
>> > Comp, following
> along
>> > the line that D. Deutsch reasons with his Church-Turing
>> > Principle, it
> would
>> > make sense that the simulations by Comp would be
>> > Boolean while Comp
> itself
>> > would be Q-Logical. What I am arguing is that MATTER is
>> > a simulation by MIND. I think that you are trying to
>> > argue the same. ;-)
>> BM:
>> OK

> [SPK]

>    So do you agree?

>>> The notion that "our thought behaves in a boolean way"
>> only comes
> from
>> > the fact that mental behavior is modeled in terms of
>> > the manipulations of symbols which is, ultimately,
>> > restricted to the possible behaviours of matter ...

>> BM:
>> Only with some physicalist postulate. I would say it is
>> matter which
>> is ultimately restricted to possible relations between
>> numbers.

> [SPK]

>    But I hope that you will admit that while being that
> is true, it is trivial given the mathematical Platonist
> assumption! What ideas do you have about a "physicalist
> postulate"? What can I read to learn more about this?

>    Maybe my question is: how does it make sense to talk
> about logical statements and relations all the while
> declaring that the existence of the manipulations of
> physical states is just the "possible relations between
> numbers"? I understand somewhat how any logical statement
> can be encoded as some string of numbers, that is a
> "Goedelization".
>    Perhaps what I need to understand how the notion of
> "meaning" and "time" are recovered. ;-)

>> > .... and could be considered as those aspects of MIND
>> > that can be projected into MATTER.
>> >     The question can be re-posed as: Is MATTER the
>> > object of MIND or is
>>> the object of MATTER?

>> BM:
>> I would say MATTER is the object of MIND, although the
>> reverse can be
> locally
>> true. Also by MIND I would'nt mean Human Mind but the
>> average mind of the universal (and immaterial) machine.

> [SPK]

>    I am trying to use MIND as an equivalence class but an
> still strugling with the notion of a "universal (and
> immaterial) machine".
>     I understand the notion of a UTM but can not
> understand how one can reason consistently about
> computations by it or any other "Machine" without
> introducing temporality and motion in some way. This is
> the same as asking how can software be said to exist
> without some way to implement it. It is in the
> implementation that time, motion, thermodynamics and other
> complications appear.

>>> Is "the content of observation" a simulation and not
>>> "out there"?

>> BM:
>> They are degrees of "out there". The content of
>> observation can be
>> a simulation AND can be out there, in platonia, for
>> example.

> [SPK]

>    Does the notion of observation itself even mean
> anything at the level of Platonia?

>> > It seems that I am asking you to question material
>> > Realism. I don't think that this would be a problem for
>> > you since your COMP theory
> is a
>>> form, IMHO, of Idealism. ;-)
>> BM:
>> Sure ;-)
> [SPK]

>    What is Time in your theory? Some kind of ordering?
> What makes it have, at least the appearence, of beng
> absolute?

I think those are excellent questions, Stephen. Time implies
an ordering. But it is not absolute.  As special relativity
teaches us, order at different locations may depend on the
state of motion.

Brent Meeker
"Sin is hoping for another life and eluding the
implacable grandeur of this life."
         -- Albert Camus (1913-1960)

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