Wei Dai wrote:


On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 10:11:04PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Of course not, no more than I would treat the copy who materialized in a
> room with the portrait of the candidate who went on to lose the election as
> a zombie. From the point of view of myself about to be duplicated, it was
> certainly be much more probable that my next experience would be of finding
> myself in the room with the portrait of the candidate who would go on to win
> (since after the election that copy would be duplicated 999 times while the
> other would not), but the probability of ending up in the room with the
> losing candidate was not zero, and after the split it is certainly true that
> both copies are equally conscious.


Suppose you get into an experiment where you're copied, then the original
is certain to be killed. According to "anticipatory" quantum immortality,
your probability of experiencing being the original after copying is
complete is 0.

Not really, there is always the possibility (perhaps a certainty if you buy the 'everything that can exist does exist' hypothesis) that an observer-moment with the same memories up to the point he was killed will arise somewhere else in the multiverse, even if it's by a random statistical fluctuation or something. In any case, even if it was possible to have a situation where the first-person probability of my becoming a particular future observer-moment were zero, that wouldn't mean that observer-moment does not experience himself as real, perhaps it would just suggest there was zero chance that his own past included my current observer-moment.


The problem here is that you're acting as if first-person measure somehow implies something about consciousness. I do think that complexity of consciousness may be one of the factors that influences first-person measure, so that I could be less likely to become a copy with large amounts of brain damage, but if my interpretation of the two-presidential-candidates though-experiment is right it obviously isn't the only factor, and therefore you can't reason in reverse that less measure --> less consciousness, since in that thought-experiment there's no reason to think either of the two copies is less conscious even if one has only 1/999th the measure of the other.

Jesse Mazer

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