----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>>When you said earlier that:
>>"In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms. These atoms
>>happen to constitute a system that has self-referential 
>>qualities that  we call consciousness."
>I would say I *own* a bunch of atoms. And we should distinguish
>third person self-reference like "after the self-duplication you will see
>me at W and at M, say", and first person self-reference like "after
>the self-duplication, if comp  is true, I will either feel to be at W, or
>I will feel to be at M, but I will never feel to be at both place at once.

I agree that *own* is a better term. But I still don't agree that I should
either feel to be W or M. I believe I would still be the original. I have
been discussing this on this list for a while and did not yet see a
convincing argument. In fact, I think the people in this list have various
different beliefs in this topic. Some say I should somehow expect to be
both at the same time; some say personal identity does not exist at all,
which is quite nice to be said but hard to make a sense of (if you are
not an enlightened buddhist or something); and some, like you, believe
I should have equal subjective probabilities of being each.
But I don't see a justification for this beyond personal taste. I know
I must have lost this argument earlier on this list, but could you
refer me to a more complete argument, or give a description of it here?


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