I will just comment on one passage you wrote as it may be of general interest.
At 5:12 PM -0800 1/11/04, Hal Finney wrote:
That would require that it is infinitely improbable that you could exist. But I don't think that is the case, because there are only a finite number of possible arrangements of matter of the size of a human being. (Equivalently, humans embody only a finite amount of information.) So it would seem that the probability of a human appearing in some universe must be finite and greater than zero, hence there would be an infinite number of instances across an infinity of universes.
First, no what I suggested was not infinite improbability but a probability so close to zero it takes infinite chances for the event to be expected even once.
What I think may be of general interest is that the discussion in the physical sciences has assumed reductionism -- that human persons are reducible to their physical bodies. However, Dennett notwithstanding, reductionism has not only not been vindicated, it remains in trouble.
There is an important implication for this issue if mental states (i.e., thoughts, beliefs, emotions) cannot be reduced to physical states. The reason is that ideas (thoughts) are not only infinite but unlike universes, which are presumably discrete), ideas are uncountably infinite. Consider, for example, how you would count ideas. Unlike the real numbers, ideas cannot even be ordered into intervals.
As a result, ideas may well represent a vastly greater infinity than universes. If so, even with infinite universes, you or I may never show up again.
Anyway, this is what I have been thinking. And, re free will, Dennett's compatibilism ultimately remains, I think, a sleight of hand. But if reductionism fails, then so does determinism (but that is a larger, social scientific argument).
-- doug porpora dept of culture and communication drexel university phila pa 19104 USA