Let X be some predicate condition on the universes in the multiverse. I think Hal is assuming that if all the following are true
1. X can be described in a compact form (ie it doesn't fill up a book with detailed data) 2. X is true for our universe 3. AUH => P(X)=0 then we deduce that AUH is (probably) false. Are you saying Wei, that there is a flaw in this logic? - David > -----Original Message----- > From: Wei Dai [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, 13 January 2004 9:22 AM > To: Hal Finney > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Peculiarities of our universe > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2004 at 09:57:18AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote: > > [...] That is > > (turning to the Schmidhuber interpretation) it must be much simpler > > to write a program that just barely allows for the possibility of life > > than to write one which makes it easy. This is a prediction of the AUH, > > and evidence against it would be evidence against the AUH. > > "evidence against it would be evidence against the AUH" is similar to the > Doomsday Argument. Let's assume that in fact universes with lots of > intelligent life don't all have much lower measure than our own. Then AUH > implies the typical observer should see many nearby intelligent life. Your > argument is that since we don't see many nearby intelligent life, AUH is > probably false. In the Doomsday Argument, the non-doomsday hypothesis > implies the typical observer should have a high birth rank, and the > argument is that since we have a low birth rank, the non-doomsday > hypothesis is probably false. > > I want to point this out because many people do not think the DA is valid > and some have produced counterarguments. Some of those counterarugments > may work against Hal's argument as well.
