Let X be some predicate condition on the universes in the multiverse. I
think Hal is assuming that if all the following are true
1. X can be described in a compact form (ie it doesn't fill up a
book with detailed data)
2. X is true for our universe
3. AUH => P(X)=0
then we deduce that AUH is (probably) false.
Are you saying Wei, that there is a flaw in this logic?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Wei Dai [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, 13 January 2004 9:22 AM
> To: Hal Finney
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Peculiarities of our universe
> On Sun, Jan 11, 2004 at 09:57:18AM -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
> > [...] That is
> > (turning to the Schmidhuber interpretation) it must be much simpler
> > to write a program that just barely allows for the possibility of
> > than to write one which makes it easy. This is a prediction of the
> > and evidence against it would be evidence against the AUH.
> "evidence against it would be evidence against the AUH" is similar to
> Doomsday Argument. Let's assume that in fact universes with lots of
> intelligent life don't all have much lower measure than our own. Then
> implies the typical observer should see many nearby intelligent life.
> argument is that since we don't see many nearby intelligent life, AUH
> probably false. In the Doomsday Argument, the non-doomsday hypothesis
> implies the typical observer should have a high birth rank, and the
> argument is that since we have a low birth rank, the non-doomsday
> hypothesis is probably false.
> I want to point this out because many people do not think the DA is
> and some have produced counterarguments. Some of those
> may work against Hal's argument as well.