Thank you for this post. It gives me a chance to reintroduce one problem that I have with your model. Like you, I am very interested in comments from others, as it could very well be that I am misunderstanding some subtle detail of your thesis.
"... remembering the comp 1-indeterminacy, that is that if you are duplicate
into an exemplary at Sidney and another at Pekin, your actual
expectation is indeterminate and can be captured by some measure,
let us say P = 1/2, and this (capital point) independently of the time
chosen for any of each reconstitution (at Pekin or Sidney), giving that the
delays of reconstitution cannot be perceived (recorded by the first person))."
Now my problem is that IF there is any aspect of perception and/or "observers" that involves a quantum mechanical state there will be the need to take the "no-cloning" theorem into account. For example, we find in the following paper a discussion of this theorem and its consequences for teleportation:
As a possible way to exploit a potential loop hole in this, I point you to the following:
My main question boils down to this: Does Comp 1-determinacy require this duplication to be exact? Is it sufficient that
approximately similar copies could be generated and not exact duplicates?
How would this affect your ideas about measures, if at all?
I understand that you are trying to derive QM from Comp and thus might not see the applicability of my question, but as a reply to this I will again point your to the various papers that have been written showing that it is impossible to embed or describe completely a QM system (and its logics) using only a classical system (and its logics), if that QM system has more that two Hilbert space dimensions associated. Start with the Kochen-Specker theorem...
I will address Kory's post latter.
- Re: Is the universe computable Stephen Paul King
- Re: Is the universe computable Bruno Marchal
- Re: Is the universe computable Hal Finney