> (through the use of Frank Jackson's colorblind Mary experiment).
> Nice piece of dialog. Actually I do think that the box/brain analogy
> is not so bad, once we agree to choose another "topology"
> for the information space, but for this I need the modal theory of
> knowledge S4 ...
I would love to read more about that. Where can I find a
I will think about it. There is the B.F. CHELLAS 1980 book
introducing modal logic which is very good as a textbook without
The new edition of Hugues and Creswell is simpler and provides
more explanation. Van Benthem's guide on "intensional logics"
gives more "philosophical" motivation, but not so much proof.
Boolos 79 is rather good for modal logic, but only with the Godelian
> Of course I mainly agree with Stathis here, and with Eric's
> assessment, but Stathis formulates it in just the way which
> makes people abusing the box analogy. Indeed, the only way
> to actually know/feel/experience the qualia is to "run" the right
> software, which really *defines* the owner.
> The choice of hardware makes no difference. The owner
> of the hardware makes no difference. This is because the owner
> is really defined by the (running) software.
> To be even more exact, there is eventually
> no need for running the software, because eventually the box
> itself is a construction of the mind, and is defined by the
> (possible) software/owner.
> That illustrates also that you cannot see "blue" as someone else
> sees "blue" by running the [someone else's software] on
> "your hardware", because if you run [someone else's software]
> on your hardware, you will just duplicate that someone-else,
> and your hardware will become [someone else's hardware!]
> And *you* will just disappear (locally).
Well, that's just where I guess we come to disagree... :)
I am still not sure I believe comp,
Good! Comp is really unbelievable, especially by sound machines ...
(of course this should be nuanced especially because here
"believe" is very informal). But nobody should believe that I believe
in comp, I believe that comp is fascinating, no more. Well if my work
is correct then we can also believe that comp is refutable.
so I am not
yet sure I agree that the hardware doesn't matter at all...
Or at least not in that strong sense that one can
expect to experience a copy of oneself elsewhere.
I am not even sure what 'one' means here...
So many doubts... :)
Just in case you find the time, it could help me to better understand
your position if you tell me where in the UDA reasoning you would
disagree: for example in the conversation with Joel Dobrzelewski:
UDA step 1 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2971.html
UDA step 2-6 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2978.html
UDA step 7 8 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html
UDA step 9 10 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2998.html
UDA last question http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3005.html
Joel 1-2-3 http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3013.html
Re: UDA... http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3019.html
Joel's nagging question http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3038.html
I say this because an _expression_ like "the hardware matters" is rather
ambiguous .... It could help you to understand why you don't believe in comp :)
Or why you have many doubts. With comp doubts can only grow ...