Dear Hal, I will have to think about this for a while. Very interesting. Meanwhile I ask that you take a look at the game theoretic semantic idea by Hintikka.

Kindest regards, Stephen ----- Original Message ----- From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, April 12, 2004 9:34 PM Subject: Re: Computational irreducibility and the simulability of worlds > Hi Stephen and Bruno: > > I only managed to jump into the list and read the last two posting on this > subject so I hope this effort to contribute is of interest in areas such as: > > [Cut and pasted out of context:] > > > >[SPK] > > > I agree with most of your premises and conclusions but I do not > > >understand how it is that we can coherently get to the case where a > > >classical computer can generate the simulation of a finite world that > > >implies QM aspects (or an ensemble of such), for more than one observer > > >including you and I, without at least accounting for the appearance of > > >implementation. > > > > [SPK] > Surely, but "all computational histories" requires at least one step to > be produced. In Platonia, there is not Time, there is not any way to "take > that one step". There is merely a Timeless Existence. How do you propose > that we recover our experience of time from this? Perhaps I need to learn > French... > > > As Alastair indicated awhile back, he and I are having a discussion in the > "Agreed Fundamentals Project" re something/nothing. > > The following is a rework of my most recent response in that > discussion. Definitions extracted from the module are below. > > xxxxxxx > > Here is sort of a very short form of the module. > > There are, it seems, three information content possibilities for the system > that could be the basis of our universe and these are: > > 1) The system contains no information. > 2) The system contains some information. > 3) The system contains all information. > > The second seems unsatisfactory since you could tune the information > content to fit your purpose. > > All I really do is to assume what is actually (I think) a bundle of no > information - my "Nothing (N)" or #1 in the above list, and a bundle of all > information - i.e. all complete sets of cf-counterfactuals - i.e. my > "Everything (E)" or #3 in the above list simultaneously. > > I then show - I think - that they are fundamentally not independent. I now > call such interdependence an example of a definitional pair. [ Whenever a > definition is made there are actually definitions of two things being > forged simultaneously - Whatever the thing you are defining is and and > another thing that is all that is left over.] > > If "all complete sets of cf-counterfactuals" is the same as all bit > strings, then as I see it the above is the same as saying that "N" contains > no number at all and that "E" contains a "normal" real number. > > Further if all information is equivalent to having no information then "all > sets of cf-counterfactuals" results in "no potential to divide" i.e. no > cf-information. So we note an odd thing: we have a definitional pair that > define two forms of the same thing - the net absence of a potential to > divide - no cf-information. > > The dynamic I develop in the module [from: only cf-counterfactuals allowed > in "E"] says that any such pair can not be static or have a fixed > evolution. In other words the boundary - no number opposed to a particular > normal real number - between the two must be dynamic and therefore > represent a sequence where "E" contains a series of normal real numbers in > random order. And because of this dynamic our universe's current state > which is a particular decode [interpretation] of a particular string in > that number will always be present and will eventually come into proper > juxtaposition [also necessarily a dynamic] with all those strings that > represent encoded possible next states - evolutionary trees - during the > dynamic. > > Now the final point I have interest in in the module is: Can there be a > fixed number of these evolutionary trees [all, some fixed fraction, none] > that have at least one path that is free of external true noise? No > because any such number would represent a cf-factual not a > cf-counterfactual. Therefore all paths eventually experience an external > noise event since "none" must randomly be the right number. > > One view of the dynamic is a computer [Turing?] moving along an infinite > string as data and outputing the original string and a computed new string > as it went. Behind that would be two more and behind each of those two > more etc. These computers would all have randomly constructed rules and be > asynchronous [the external true noise]. The result to me seems to be a > dynamic of all possible universes evolving to all possible next states. > > --------------- From the module - more or less > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > I see no difference between cf-information [a term defined in the module - > see below] and the usual idea of information and intend none. > > [1def] cf-Information: The potential to divide as with a boundary. An > Example: The information in a Formal Axiomatic System [FAS] divides true > statements from not true statements [relevant to that FAS]. > > [2def] cf-Factual: A particular potential to divide. Used as a noun. An > example: The FAS known as Arithmetic. > > [4def] cf-Counterfactual: A cf-factual [cf-factual B] that to some degree > influences the potential to divide or actual division of another cf-factual > [cf-factual A]. Used as a noun. Note that a cf-factual that has a > cf-counterfactual is itself a cf-counterfactual. > > [5def] cf-Effect: An all inclusive range of influences between cf-factuals > that establish a cf-counterfactual relationship between two or more > them. One type of influence between cf-counterfactuals could be where > "existence" encompasses two logic systems such that in one the statement > "A" is true and in the other the statement "Not A" is true. Taken together > the two logic systems influence each other's division of statement A with > regard to truth by making it indeterminate at the level of > "existence". This influence may be far narrower than the range of > influences that may be necessarily encompassed in the cf-effect. The > possible added range may be relevant if there are more than two > cf-counterfactuals in the relationship. A rough example is provided by the > way in which red, green, and blue can be combined to produce any color > including shades of gray. > > [6def] Complete set of cf-counterfactuals: A collection of > cf-counterfactuals that leaves no member without a cf-effect [a countering > influence] to any of its aspects by some other member or combination of > members of the same set. The word "set" has no other connotation. > > Hal > > >