At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book "Reasons and Persons") that we are "token". I have already argued that with the comp hyp we can only be "type". That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy, but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing argument.)
I agree that it's not a convincing argument, but it does seem like an easy statement. If comp is true, aren't we immortal? If not, why not?
I do thing that comp (and/or Everett QM) leads to a form, perhaps more than one form actually, of immortality. But the very meaning of such statement will remain very ambiguous without digging deeper in the personal identity issue (which, despite Stathis Papaioannou's remark, is not necessary for getting the physics/psycho reversal). It is perhaps less misleading to say that what comp shows is that "mortality" is no more obvious. It is less misleading because comp will appear to have a necessary interrogative status: no sound machine can ever entirely be convinced of the truth of comp; a comp-practitioner should infer it again and again. (I think the brain does just that in the form of an instinctive dialog between the cerebral stem and the cortex).
Look perhaps at some of James Higgo "immortality" posts for previous discussions on that not so obvious thread. Jacques Mallah gave interesting rebuttal ...