The problems that I have
with Bruno's thesis is Digital substitution and
that it does not address the problem of epiphenomenona found in both Idealism
and Materialism. Digital substitution seems to assume that consciousness
and awareness and related notions can be completely explained in terms of how
one number relates to another.
I think that your would agree that Bruno's
thesis is a very sophisticated form of Idealism. It is widely recognized that
"matter" and physicality in general is an epiphenomenona within any Ideal
theory. This in turn makes the notion of a physical substrate suspect as it does
not exist apart from its properties as encoded in numbers, e.g. our
consciousness is merely information thus what that information is "encoded" in
What I am trying to do is to make the
point that it is not sufficient to just take as an article of faith or
postulation the idea that digital substitution is actually possible, especially
when the epiphenomenona problem is not even addressed! OTOH, if it can be shown
that digital substitution is possible in practice then Bruno's thesis will go
along way to explaining many things. But there is more to my difficulties than
this! Copying, to me, implies that something is doing the copying. What is that
which does the copying? Physical states are mere epiphenomenona...
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, June 15, 2004 4:25
Subject: Re: duplicatability or copying
Let me add my grain of salt to Bruno's post.
The No Cloning Theorem applies to the physical duplication but not necessarily
to the duplication of information that is carried by a physical substrate. For
example, you could very well make a copy of a DVD that reproduces exactly the
information stored in the DVD without reproducing exactly the atomic
arrangement of the DVD.
The crucial question is whether our
consciousness is aware of its physical substrate at the atomic (Planck) level
or only at a much higher biological, neurological or psychological level.
Would we agree ("Yes Doctor") to an organ substitution at the high level or
would we hold out for a a substitution at the Planck level? If we allow
copying at the high level, then Bruno's thesis survives.
resolution should the copier have? I don't know the answer to this question. I
don't even know if copying (increasing measure) has any ethical significance
or any other value or drawbacks.
Stephen Paul King
Does your thesis survive without the
notion of duplicatability or copying? As I have pointed
out, QM does not allow duplication and I am hard pressed to understand how
duplication can be carried out in classical physics.
If we merely consider the Platonia of
mathematics we find only a single example of each and every number. If
we assume digital substitutability there would be one and only one number
for each and every physical object. Where does duplication obtain in
Platonia? If duplicatability is an impossible notion, does your thesis
- Re: duplicatability or copying is problematic Stephen Paul King