The paper cited below is consistent with the reductionist view that there must be a distinct brain state giving rise to each distinct mental state. "Whenever neurones A,B,C fire the subject experiences sensations X,Y,Z."
I agree (except that you assume some high level of description of the brain, but what you say is compatible with comp, I don't need that assumption, I am agnostic on the substitution level).
To include the phenomenon of first person experience one could add: "...and only the subject whose neurones are thus firing can know directly what it feels like to experience X,Y,Z." I believe this is as much as it is possible for an empirical science to say about the mind-body problem.
100% OK. But then I illustrate (at least) that with some hypothesis you can extract
theories which explain much more (matter and mind in particular). But the experimental bets
you describe is always part of a "yes doctor" form of act of faith. Sure.