Hi Jesse:

I think some confusion took place surrounding the posts on or about 12/10.

In my initial post I said:


"9) Notice that the All also has a logical problem.  Looking at the same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers because just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal information which is not an aspect of the complete conceptual ensemble content of the All.   Thus the All is internally inconsistent.

10) Thus the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must be consistent with this inconsistency - That is the motion is at least partly random"


This has still not been commented on in the thread.  Things got more confused when the "internal" was somehow lost and we got on to a discussion of specific possible internal components of the All and their consistency.  As I said in an earlier post the All has no net information so any idea that it is itself - as an entity - is inconsistent has no basis.  It can not be consistent in the true/false way either.  I do not think that anyone has demonstrated that the All can not have internal components that are true/false inconsistent.  Thus my point in the initial post:


"10) Thus the motion of a shock wave boundary [an evolving Something] in the All must be consistent with this inconsistency - That is the motion is at least partly random."

Today I would amend # 10 because "random" is not correct in my opinion because it has to pay attention to history to know it is indeed random.  So the most recent motion must rather be inconsistent with its past or future - no accumulating info.


At 10:04 PM 12/20/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

I do not think the conversation re:

"I can't think of any historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already believe their premises in order to justify these premises",

has a valid place in this thread.  Can you tell me why you do?

Because you have said that your theory has this feature, and I was trying to understand if I might be misunderstanding you by asking you for other examples of theories that you think had this feature--I thought perhaps we might be understanding the idea of "having to believe the premises in order to justify the premises" differently, so that you might not actually be asking people to accept the tenets of your theory on blind faith. But if there is no misunderstanding, and you are indeed saying there is absolutely no justification for believing your theory in terms of any preexisting concepts we might have, then I suppose there is no further need to discuss this question.

I still have the feeling that this is not quite the case though, since you are asking for comments/critiques of your theory, but what possible basis could comments/critiques have unless you believed we all had some shared standards for judging the merits of the theory? I think if you are able to figure out what standards you are using to judge the various elements of the theory, and what standards you expect others to judge it by in order to have useful comments about it, then if you can articulate these standards you may be able to give a clearer explanation of why you think it makes sense to accept  your theory. For example, one of these standards may be the "a theory of everything should have no arbitrary elements" idea, which I think is shared by a lot of people on this list (I described this as the 'arbitrariness problem' in my post at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2606.html ), and which you call the "no information" rule.


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