In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with the dynamic's past [to avoid the net information necessary to describe a structured dynamic - even a random one].
This will produce sequences of world kernels [worlds] given physical reality that permit the continuation of large kernel sub components from kernel to kernel. Some of these sequences could be such that the entire kernels and the sequence of such could be properly emulated by a Turing machine. This however is not the same as the Turing machine emulating the entire evolution of that world since the dynamic that establishes the emulable sequence can terminate its emulability [or even just switch machines] without regard to the state of the emulating Turing machine.
For this reason I must currently reject "Schmidhuber Comp: The universe is computable/Turing emulable."
Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.
So I find I must also reject "..." "Comp: I (you) am (are) computable/Turing emulable."
I have no problem with that; but your phrasing is too fuzzy for me to follow the reason why you reject both Schmidhuber and the "personal-comp". Do you really mean that your "theory" would made you say no to a doctor presenting you an artificial brain (even with a very low substitution level description of yourself) ?
Remember that my point is just that is we are machine then physics is 100% derivable from computer science. (But even if we succeed to derive 100% of physics from comp this would not be a proof that comp is true).