Hi Bruno:

At 09:51 AM 1/17/2005, you wrote:
Hello Hal,

snip mine

Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.


So I find I must also reject "..." "Comp: I (you) am (are) computable/Turing emulable."

I have no problem with that; but your phrasing is too fuzzy for me to follow the reason why you reject both Schmidhuber and the "personal-comp".

I reject Schmidhuber Comp because a sequence of world states [world kernels] which may indeed be Turing machine [or some extension there of] emulable is nevertheless managed by the system's dynamic which is external to the machine.

Any sub component of a world kernel [such as myself] is subject to the same result thus my rejection of Personal Comp.

Do you really mean that your "theory" would made you say no to a doctor presenting you an artificial brain (even with a very low substitution level description of yourself) ?

First assume that choice is available to sub components of a world state.

I would not accept because even if the dynamic is such that my world state sequence suffers only minor shifts such as jumping to slightly different machines I do not believe there is a current description of me low enough that the artificial brain would not lead to a divergence of my future history from what it would have been with my current biological brain. [The dynamic can eventually change my description on the fly in any event.] I would be selecting one future history vs another. Just having the procedure or not is such a selection [choice] [my current brain would suffer some alternate future history as well] and demonstrates that the two courses are not the same.

Having no way to select between these future histories I would stay the course with what I had.

Is choice available?

There is no change taking place during the physical reality of a world kernel. Any sub component of a world kernel can not influence the next kernel selected for the sequence since influence is a change. Only the external dynamic selects the succeeding world kernel and this selection is inconsistent with any past selection. There is no choice.

Remember that my point is just that is we are machine then physics is 100% derivable from computer science.

I suspect that this may be correct for sequences that suffer only small shifts in the machine that can emulate them given that all the machines are after all computers by assumption. Allowing the ability to Turing emulate a sub component of a kernel in a portion of a sequence is the same as allowing the ability to Turing emulate the entire kernel containing the sub component in the same portion of the sequence since one can not establish an isolating cut between a sub component and the kernel it is a part of.

(But even if we succeed to derive 100% of physics from comp this would not be a proof that comp is true).



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