I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of
similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the
absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given

Given the absolute measure you can define effective conditional
probabilities, except in cases where branches lead to death. In these cases,
the ''conditional probability'' of there being a next experience at all
would be less than 1.


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----- Oorspronkelijk bericht ----- 
Van: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <everything-list@eskimo.com>
Verzonden: Thursday, April 14, 2005 10:20 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >>Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> >> > QM or QTI do not imply
> >> > that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never
> >> > *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you
> >>wake
> >> > up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if
> >>die
> >> > in your sleep - then you never experience that particular branch of
> >>MW.
> >> > In other words, you can only experience those worlds where the loss
> >> > consciousness is temporary.
> >>
> >>How about impairment of consciousness?  Can you experience that?  Can
> >>experience going crazy, or having a reduced level of consciousness where
> >>you are drugged or barely alive?  That's how death is for most people,
> >>it's not like flicking off a light.  Will Quantum Immortality protect
> >>from spending an eternity in a near-coma?  Exactly how much
> >>does it guarantee you?
> >>
> >>Hal Finney
> >>
> >Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some
> >worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the
> >consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max
> >Tegmark aknowledged this in a commentary on his original paper. If you're
> >really unlucky, you will experience eternal torment in the flames of
> >And unlike the Christian Hell, you don't actually have to do something
> >wrong to end up in QTI hell: it all depends on the fall of the cosmic
> >
> >One question which comes up is, when do you stop being you? I suppose
> >is an answer to your "how much consciousness is guaranteed" question:
> >you lose enough consciousness that you forget who you are, that is the
> >cutoff where you can really be said to have lost consciousness.
> I think that's too handwavey--I think that to really have a satisfying
> answer to this question, you need some kind of formal theory of
> consciousness that answers questions like, "If I am currently experiencing
> observer-moment A, what is the probability that my next experience will of
> observer-moment B vs. observer-moment C"? I think the answer should depend
> both on some sort of measure of the "similarity" of A and B vs. A and C
> deal with the 'when do you stop being you' question), and also on some
> notion of the absolute probability of B vs. C (for example, if B and C are
> both equally 'similar' to your current experience A, but B is experiencing
> some kind of thermodynamic miracle while C is experiencing business as
> usual, then C would be more likely). I elaborated on these ideas in my
> in the "Request for a glossary of acronyms" thread at
> http://tinyurl.com/5265d
> Jesse

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