J. Colvin wrote:
>> >why do you say that it is logically
>> >impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is
>> >*logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a
>> >logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5.
I will be back to this quote later on.

I did not follow this thread, because immortality is a nono for my mostly
common sense thinking: who wants to 'in eternity' wake up with arthritic
pains and struggle with failing memory? Or is immortality understood for an
earlier (perfect? when is it?) stage of life, let us say when we get an ugly
divorce, or in miltary service? why not as a fetus? is the 'rest of the
world' similarly immortal (fetus? or Alzheimer?) and if I like something, I
know it will go away for sure... So: I am not for immortality.

Now I have read in, because almost ALL members I appreciate here posted
ideas in the thread. I cannot keep my mouse shut either, picking on the
quote above from Jonathan.

First the 2+2=5  carefully restricted to logical or math. I could mention a
1+1=3 nonmathematical case, called matrimonial conception, when it is not
contradictory - even for the most anthropocentric/mathloving minds.

Which brings me back to J.C.'s quote on the electron.
In my little common sense mind the first question is 'intelligence' - so far
not generally-acceptibly identified. I like the "elasticity of the mind
based on a well working memory" (where mempory carries the questionmark).
Some go for the Latin origin: "to read in between", understanding more than
just literally. Both are inapplicable here, because these (and I suspect all
others the honored listmembers have in mind (what is it?) are fully and
exclusively anthropocentric - human related conceptualizations. The poor
electron has no interconnected neuronal functions so why not consider it in
its own merit, not as a human? And so its (electron-)intelligence?

Unless one is a stubborn materialist, the electron has to be more than just
a what? wave, or particle (what is it?) as physically measurable (if!) in
our obsolete model-system called physical world. Struggling with the words,
I would say: some "ideation" (kudos for a better word!) belongs to an
electron as well as to anything else we do or don't know about.
Consider now an 'ideation' of an electron, not in human terms of course, why
should it be restricted to less than omniscience? especially since it is in
a total interconnection with all the rest?

Let me pass on the anthropomorphic use of examples: RULES (by humans, of
course) of chess, or of THAT arithemtic math we apply. If we talk about more
than just human, we should think in terms of more than just human.

Well, this does not sound too constructive, but alas, so are considetrations
on shaky grounds (and their conclusions) as well. Excuse my intrusion

John Mikes

----- Original Message -----
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <everything-list@eskimo.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 1:07 AM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality

> >Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> >
> >> >>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically
> >impossible
> >> >>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk
> >about) a world
> >> >>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be
> >> >>logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously
> >> >>have
> >> >property X
> >> >>and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent
> >> >for there to
> >> >>exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I
> >> >consist of a single elctron.
> >> >>Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible).
> >> >Such a world
> >> >>may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all
> >> >instantiated programs.
> >> >
> >> >Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a single
> >> >electron does indeed have all possible knowledge encoded in
> >one bit.
> >> >But leaving that aside, why do you say that it is logically
> >> >impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is
> >> >*logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a
> >> >logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5.
> >>
> >>My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may
> >>be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if
> >>we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such
> >contradictions
> >>must "scale up" into the categories of things and worlds. All
> >possible
> >>things exist; and all impossible things do not. How do we decide
> >>whether "an omniscient electron" is a possible thing? It
> >certainly does
> >>not appear to be; and the point is that it may *in fact* be an
> >>impossible thing. It is straightforward to show that 2+2=5 is
> >>contradictory under number theory. It is obviously not so
> >>straightforward to show that "an omniscient electron" is equally
> >>a-priori contradictory. It is not even obvious that "an omniscient
> >>electron" is in the same category of propositions as "2+2=5". But I'd
> >>argue that if we take Tegmark seriously, then it should be.
> >>
> >>Jonathan Colvin
> >
> >Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you
> >think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a
> >priori contradictory?
> That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori
> illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious
> is allowed and what is forbidden. That's why I can't consistently predict
> what tomorrow's lottery numbers will be. So if I could answer your
> I'd probably be out buying lottery tickets right now :).
> Jonathan Colvin

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