>Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life.
>Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of
>two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one
>cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it
>holds a million bits. This one cell is tiny like an electron;
>yet it holds a great deal of information, like an omniscient entity.
>This description is logically contradictory. A system with
>only two states cannot hold a million bits of information.
>That is an elementary theorem of mathematical information theory.
>The problem is not specific to a world. The problem is with
>the concept that a two state system can hold a million bits.
>That concept is inherently contradictory. That makes it
>meaningless. Trying to apply it to a world or to anything
>else is going to produce meaningless results.
>Rather than say that such a world cannot exist because it is
>logically contradictory, it makes more sense to say that
>logically contradictory descriptions fail to describe worlds,
>because they fail to describe anything in a meaningful way.
In what way are those two statements not equivalent? They both seem to make
the same point, which is that logically contradictory descriptions "do not