>-----Original Message-----
>From: John Collins [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2005 10:22 AM
>To: Quentin Anciaux; everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>
>Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>"
>>Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
>>> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
>> >be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
>> >is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
>>>
>> >Hal Finney
>>
>>Hi,
>>
>>but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is
>to
>>experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where
>you
>>have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can
>>only experience world where you are alive... And to continue, I find it
>very
>>difficult to imagine what could mean being unconscious forever (what you
>>suggest to be likely).
>
>>Quentin Anciaux
>"
>..You are working from the assumtion that each person has some sort of
>transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would
>think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment,
>with memories being distinguished from "instantaneous" thoughts just by
>their being repeated several (or even millions of) times. As an
>illustration, try and remember what you had for dinner on your fifth
>birthday. Whether you remember or not, tou only know if you remember when
>you try to recall it, so you can't really pretend the piece of information
>is continuously present.

I agree there is reason to postulate a transcedent observer; I'm content with a
physical observer.  That's one of the things that bothers me about "observer
moments", but I think it's just English grammar that pushes us to have a
subject.  If you're going to reconstruct physics from discrete subjective
experiences you need to be able to collect and order experiences according from
viewpoint - which corresponds to an "observer" - and according to
intersubjective agreement among observers - which corresponds to the physical
world.

But just because the subjective observer is a construct, doesn't justify the
pejorative "pretend".  I think I have considerable evidence for information,
such as what I ate for breakfast, being persistently encoded in my brain.  No
only the fact that I can recall such information, but also that my ability to
do so diminishes with time and may be lost due to disease or injury.

Brent Meeker

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