Two points: I am pointing out that the "non-interactional" idea of computation and any form of monism will fail to account for the "necessity" of 1st person viewpoints. I am advocating a form of dualism, a "process" dualism based on the work of Vaughan Pratt.
What in interesting about this form of dualism is that the dual aspects become identical to each other (automorphic?) in the limit of infinite Minds and Bodies. I don't have time to explain the details of this right now but your fears can be assuaged: there is no coherent notion of an "immaterial soul" nor a "mindless body". An example of the former is a complete atomic Boolean algebra that can not be instantiated physically by any means and an example the latter is found in considering a physical object that has no possible representation.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, May 15, 2005 8:32 AM
Subject: Re: Olympia's Beautiful and Profound Mind
I appreciate that there are genuine problems in the theory of computation as applied to intelligent and/or conscious minds. However, we know that intelligent and conscious minds do in fact exist, running on biological hardware. The situation is a bit like seeing an aeroplane in the sky then trying to figure out the physics of heavier than air flight; if you prove that it's impossible, then there has to be something wrong with your proof.
If it does turn out that the brain is not Turing emulable, what are the implications of this? Could we still build a conscious machine with appropriate soldering and coding, or would we have to surrender to dualism/ an immaterial soul/ Roger Penrose or what?