In AI we consider (certain) qualia (characteristics) of the mind to get
simulated by the machine, in first range those ones that are relevant to the
activities we are interested in, but really: a choice of only those we know
about at all in the model we have of human mentality. There is always more
to it and we disregard the rest of the totality (of course).
The billiard ball also has more to it than in our model's characteristics
of the toy we consider. That's the way we think.
What brings to my mind the silly young peasant girl who worked in my
grandparents' home in the 30s and was sent down to the cellar made by my
grandfather with a horizontal trap-door covering the stairs down. She came
back desperate that the door does not open.
She was standing on it. The joke is on us:
Are we not trying to explain our own consciousness, using our own
consciousness, the mind, using our mind, and the (rest of the?) world
'objectively' - of which we are an intrinsic part of?
Aren't we standing on the trap door and try to lift it?
Excuse my rambling, I am not against advamced thinking, just apply always
the notion of a humble insecurity: that's all I can think of with my limited
means and there always may be much more to it.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:33 PM
Subject: RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
> Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a
> simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a "real" one, and would
> experience the same "qualia". There's no special "interface" required
> the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are in the same
> ie. at the same level of simulation. As far as the simulated person is
> concerned, the billiard ball is "real". Of course, the simulation can also
> contain a simulation of the billiard ball (2nd level simulation), which
> equally be unable to bruise the simulated person, and so on ad infinitum.
> we take Bostrom's simulation argument seriously, we all exist in some Nth
> level simulation, while our simulated billiard ball exists at the (N+1)th
> Jonathan Colvin
> > Stephen: Your claim reminds me of the scene in the movie Matrix:
> > Reloaded where Neo deactivates some Sentinels all the while
> > believing that he is Unplugged.
> > This leads to speculations about "matrix in a matrix", etc.
> > http://www.thematrix101.com/reloaded/meaning.php#mwam
> > There is still one question that needs to be answered:
> > what is it that gives rise to the differentiation necessary
> > for one "description" to "bruise" (or cause any kind of
> > change) in another "description" if we disallow for some
> > thing that acts as an "interface" between the two.
> > What forms the "interface" in your theory?
> > http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0001/0001064.pdf
> > Stephen
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Cc: <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:56 AM
> > Subject: Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
> > >
> > > Le 17-mai-05, à 09:56, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
> > >
> > >> Is it any
> > >> stranger that a blind man can not see, than that a
> > description of a
> > >> billiard
> > >> ball's properties (weight, diameter, colour etc) can not bruise me?
> > >
> > >
> > > It is different with comp. because a description of you + a
> > description of
> > > billiard ball, done at some right level, can bruise you.
> > >
> > > Bruno
> > >
> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> > >
> > >