Lee writes: 
>> Jonathan: Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI;
that a 
>> simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a "real" one, and 
>> would experience the same "qualia". There's no special "interface" 
>> required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billiard 
>ball are 
>> in the same "world", ie. at the same level of simulation. As far as 
>> the simulated person is concerned, the billiard ball is "real". Of 
>> course, the simulation can also contain a simulation of the billiard 
>> ball (2nd level simulation), which will equally be unable to bruise 
>> the simulated person, and so on ad infinitum. If we take Bostrom's 
>> simulation argument seriously, we all exist in some Nth level 
>> simulation, while our simulated billiard ball exists at the 
>(N+1)th level.
>Now just to keep our bookkeeping accurate, Bruno Marchal's 
>claims far exceed what you have written.
>No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. He 
>attempts to derive physics from the theory of computation 
>(i.e., recursive functions, effective computability, 
>incompleteness, and unsolvability).
>His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, and conjectures 
>that attempt to reduce physics to a completely timeless abstract world.
>Julian Barbour, in The End of Time, gave, as you probably 
>know, one of the most brilliant presentations from this perspective.

Sure; but I was just addressing the observation by Bruno that a description
of a ball can bruise you (if you are also a description). That observation
is not unique to Bruno's Comp; it applies to any theory that accepts the
premise of Strong AI.


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