Le 19-mai-05, à 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words) "not
Turing -computable", I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
I would like to insist on this key point: comp entails that first person reality, whatever it is, is NOT COMPUTABLE. (and the UDA shows that physics is among the 1-realities).
If I am a machine then whatever I am embedded in, CANNOT BE CAPTURED BY ANY PROGRAM, with the exception of the UD which does not really captured reality as we can know it, because the capture in provably NOT EFFECTIVE. The UD generates all the machine "dreams" which by highly non trivial interference (not the quantum one but the comp one) generates a non computable "solidity".
To understand COMP = to understand we are infinitely more ignorant than we could have thought. And this aspect of comp appears still more clearly in the "interview" of the Loebian machine which is the most modest being ever conceived until now (to my knowledge).
John, I'm afraid you still have a reductionist, pre-godelian, understanding of machine. Or perhaps, by inattention you are coming back to such a reductionist conception of machine. Since Goedel 1931 such a reductive view of machine is just wrong. Godel's theorem is the realisation that we just don't know what universal machine are, what they are able to do. It makes us humble!
I insist because that's a widespread misconception. The real miracle is that those machine dreams are still interfering in a way which makes the appearance of physical reality locally testable, inluding the testability of comp itself.
And so I do agree with ROSEN's conclusion that "nature" is not computable. But I extracted this by what amounts essentially to a self-finiteness assumption (that's comp) where Rosen got it by assuming at the start that he is natural and by assuming at the start that nature is not computable. I don't do that because I have never understand what the word "Nature" means in that context, except as some dogmatic oversimplification of Aristotle physics and theology.