Le 22-mai-05, à 06:29, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:


People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the "consciousness doesn't
really exist"
and the "it exists and we can explain it" factions. I did not
mean that there is no explanation possible for consciousness.
It is likely that in the course of time the neuronal
mechanisms behind the phenomenon will be worked out and it
will be possible to build intelligent, conscious machines.
Imagine that advanced aliens have already achieved this
through surreptitious study of humans over a number of
decades. Their models of human brain function are so good
that by running an emulation of one or more humans and their
environment they can predict their behaviour better than the
humans can themselves. Now, I think you will agree (although
Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this excellent
understanding of the processes giving rise to human conscious
experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea what
the experience is actually like.

No, I'd agree that they have no idea what the experience is like. But this is no more remarkable than the fact that allthough we may have an excellent understanding of photons, we can not travel at the speed of light, or that although we may have an excellent understanding of trees, yet we can not
photosynthesize. Neither of these "problems" seem particularly hard.

But we can photosynthesize. And we can understand why we cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by using purely 3-person description of those phenomena in some theory. With consciousness, the range of the debate goes from non-existence to only-existing. The problem is that it seems that an entirely 3-person explanation of the brain-muscles relations evacuates any purpose for consciousness and the 1-person. That's not the case with photosynthesis.

To be more strictly analogous with the situation for consciousness, what Jonathan could have said is that we have no idea what it is like to *be* a photon or to *be* a tree photosynthesising. Most people would say that photons and trees aren't conscious, and therefore they *can* be entirely understood from a 3rd person perspective. Perhaps this is true, but it is not logically consistent to say that it must be true and still maintain the 1st person/ 3rd person distinction we have been discussing. This is because the whole point of the distinction is that it is not possible to deduce or understand that which is special about 1st person experience (namely, consciousness) from an entirely 3rd person perspective. The aliens I have described in my example could be as different from us as we are different from trees, and they could easily conclude that an emulation of our minds is not fundamentally different from an emulation of our weather.

Which means we agree completely. I thought Jonathan, in the manner of John Searle, was arguing that nothing in principle distinguishes a phenomenon like consciousness and photosynthesis. And this is just a traditional move made by the so-called elimininative materialists who just pretend consciousness (and first person) does not exist. The error they make, I think, comes from the fact that scientific discourses are (by construction) made only in the 3-person manner. But nothing prevents us to try (at least) to have some axiomatic of the first person discourse and to make some 3-person statements about it. And knowledge theory are like that. There is even a quasi-unanimity on the basic axiom of knowledge "to know p entails p" (Cp -> p).



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