RMiller writes

> I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm 
> focusing on what the behavior system perceives ("measures"). If all 
> possible worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior system 
> should likewise exist in a superpositional state.  If there are say, 10 
> possible "worlds" available to the behavioral state (percipient) but each 
> world differs from the other by elements that are not observed by the 
> percipient, then the behavior system is under the assumption that 
> interaction is taking place with a single, unified environment.

Yes, evidently one term in wide use here to describe this is
"observer-moment". We identify (mathematically) all these points
that are not distinguished from each other in an entity's observations.

> What if Deutsch is incorrect about contact between the various 
> worlds?  Suppose the behavior system normally exists across a manifold of 
> closely-linked probabilities, with the similarities forming a central 
> tendency and the differences existing at each edge of the distribution?

Could you repeat that, perhaps using different words? I'm not
quite confident that I know what you mean.

> Bottom line, it may be useful to take a step back and challenge some of our 
> primary assumptions---namely, that we exist in a discrete world in the 
> multiverse and that we can never "step" into the one next door.   That is, 
> we may be wondering why we can't visit the next room, when in fact, we 
> inhabit the entire neighborhood.

I think that the usual interpretation of the MWI, at least the
one espoused by David Deutsch, has an observer inhabiting the
entire neighborhood. Which fits well with the doctrine of 
identifying all the equivalent observer-moments. Moreover,
many of us, (including Deutsch, so far as I can tell), go
further and believe that in a strong sense we are *not*
confined already to just our observer moment, but that,
for example, there is a version of me who was interrupted
a second ago by the telephone, and I fully identify with him.

But when you say that one can "step" into a universe next door,
it brings up associations that perhaps you don't intend. It
may imply the view (held by some people I know) that they need
identify only with a certain outcome of an experiment; they
choose to believe that they are not the person who saw the
other outcome.

The usual meaning of "we can never step into the one next
door" is that if you have memories of one outcome of an
experiment, then you cannot sanely abandon your habitation
of the universe in which that happened, and instead take
up residence somehow in the other universe.  I would presume
that you agree with that.


Reply via email to