This may be clarified by a paper that Richard ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) and I wrote together. http://www.futuretag.net/hitbang/2005/03/shadows-and-concept-of-self.php We would love hearing what you guys think.
On 5/23/05, rmiller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm > focusing on what the behavior system perceives ("measures"). If all > possible worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior system > should likewise exist in a superpositional state. If there are say, 10 > possible "worlds" available to the behavioral state (percipient) but each > world differs from the other by elements that are not observed by the > percipient, then the behavior system is under the assumption that > interaction is taking place with a single, unified environment. > > Recalling the Copenhagen interpretation: does Chicago exist if you happen > to be by yourself in a hotel room in Des Plaines, IL? The answer is > irrelevant until the behavior system begins to experience some aspect of > Chicago. > > What if Deutsch is incorrect about contact between the various > worlds? Suppose the behavior system normally exists across a manifold of > closely-linked probabilities, with the similarities forming a central > tendency and the differences existing at each edge of the distribution? If > the behavior system can perceive only a small chunk of information at a > time, then it may be possible that each percipient really does live in his > or her own little world---a small island of similar probabilities > made"real" from the larger cloud of probabilities. > > If we quantify a behavior system in terms of elements and interactions > between elements, we arrive at a complex, but definable state. If that > behavior system exists across multiple worlds that differ in minute details > (i.e. a unobserved kitchen saucer moved an inch to the side) then the > behavior systems would exist as identical entities (or, as my friend Giu P. > would say, *shadows*) across the similar "sections." Employing a little > math, the behavior system could exist as an object in Z space--not too > different than a fibre bundle in topology. Differences among the > realized probabilities among these "shadow worlds" might show up at each > end of the normal distribution, but may be still be perceived by the > behavior system as guesses or hunches, depending upon where the primary > centre of the behavioral bundle is at the time. Psychology experiments in > the 1980s suggest (to me anyway) that a psychological mechanism has evolved > that helps the behavioral system "negotiate" this territory. > > Bottom line, it may be useful to take a step back and challenge some of our > primary assumptions---namely, that we exist in a discrete world in the > multiverse and that we can never "step" into the one next door. That is, > we may be wondering why we can't visit the next room, when in fact, we > inhabit the entire neighborhood. > > RMiller