This may be clarified by a paper that Richard ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) and
I wrote together.
We would love hearing what you guys think.

On 5/23/05, rmiller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm
> focusing on what the behavior system perceives ("measures"). If all
> possible worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior system
> should likewise exist in a superpositional state.  If there are say, 10
> possible "worlds" available to the behavioral state (percipient) but each
> world differs from the other by elements that are not observed by the
> percipient, then the behavior system is under the assumption that
> interaction is taking place with a single, unified environment.
> Recalling the Copenhagen interpretation: does Chicago exist if you happen
> to be by yourself in a hotel room in Des Plaines, IL?  The answer is
> irrelevant until the behavior system begins to experience some aspect of
> Chicago.
> What if Deutsch is incorrect about contact between the various
> worlds?  Suppose the behavior system normally exists across a manifold of
> closely-linked probabilities, with the similarities forming a central
> tendency and the differences existing at each edge of the distribution? If
> the behavior system can perceive only a small chunk of information at a
> time, then it may be possible that each percipient really does live in his
> or her own little world---a small island of similar probabilities
> made"real" from the larger cloud of probabilities.
> If we quantify a behavior system in terms of elements and interactions
> between elements, we arrive at a complex, but definable state.  If that
> behavior system exists across multiple worlds that differ in minute details
> (i.e. a unobserved kitchen saucer moved an inch to the side) then the
> behavior systems would exist as identical entities (or, as my friend Giu P.
> would say, *shadows*) across the similar "sections."   Employing a little
> math, the behavior system could exist as an object in Z space--not too
> different than a fibre bundle in topology.    Differences among the
> realized probabilities among these "shadow worlds" might show up at each
> end of the normal distribution, but may be still be perceived by the
> behavior system as guesses or hunches, depending upon where the primary
> centre of the behavioral bundle is at the time.  Psychology experiments in
> the 1980s suggest (to me anyway) that a psychological mechanism has evolved
> that helps the behavioral system "negotiate" this territory.
> Bottom line, it may be useful to take a step back and challenge some of our
> primary assumptions---namely, that we exist in a discrete world in the
> multiverse and that we can never "step" into the one next door.   That is,
> we may be wondering why we can't visit the next room, when in fact, we
> inhabit the entire neighborhood.
> RMiller

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