Le 22-mai-05, à 17:03, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):

The response of those who think that consciousness is nothing special to the above is that it is not surprising that there is a difference between a description of an object and the object itself, and that what I have called "knowledge" in reference to conscious experiences is not really knowledge, but part of the package that comes with being a thing. I can't really argue against this; as I said, it is just a different way of looking at the same facts.

Exactly. And that is something utterly important, I think, which people always forget. This his has been understand and explained recurrently in humanity life. As example I have found it rather explicitly state

1) An indian text of the eleventh century (I think): Drg-Drçya-Viveka, Comment discriminer le spectateur du spectacle ?, Traduction de la version anglaisse due à Nikhilânanda par Marcel Sauton, Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, Adrien Maisonneuve, Paris.

2) The old Wittgenstein in his last book "on uncertainty", where he says that" to know" and "to believe" could be the same state of mind, but in different context.

3) The Plato's Theaetetus, when he defined knowing by justified true belief.

4) Stathis (see above). Er ... Correct me if I am wrong ;)

5) Boolos, Goldblatt, Kuznetsov and Muravitski: when they discover that G* proves that Bp is equivalent with (Bp and p), but that G does not prove it, so that the logic of Cp = (Bp and p) gives a knower logic. Bp and (Bp and p) are just different way of looking to the same arithmetical fact, but the (godelian) gap between proof (G) and truth (G*) makes both logics quite different. Stephen: it is the logic of Cp, (= Bp & p) which give rise to S4Grz (the "canonical" machine first person knower/time logic).

Those who does not understand the "4)" should take it as an advertising for Smullyan's Forever Undecided, and the whole Godel Lob provability/consistency field.


PS Axiom of G and G*, and S4Grz can be found in my 1999 post to the list:


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