Le 01-juin-05, à 17:24, scerir a écrit :

Bruno Marchal:
To be clear I have only proved that IF COMP is taken seriously enough
THEN the appearance of a "pre-existing physical world", including its
stability, lawfulness ... MUST BE derivable from the relation between
numbers. This is done. Then I got results confirming in part that comp
can be true, in proving that the logic of physical propositions is not
boolean and even has a quantum smelling (to be short).


Sorry for my naiveté. Has the above something to
do with the quotation below? I mean, what is the
main difference?

"The only laws of matter are those
which our minds must fabricate,
and the only laws of mind
are fabricated for it by matter."
- James Clerk Maxwell


It is perhaps not so different. The difference is perhaps that my proposition has been the object of a proof, where Maxwell looks like a poem. Also Maxwell's statement looks circular, he says that minds fabricate matter and matter fabricate minds, where I say that if we take comp seriously then we are lead to: numbers fabricate mind which fabricate matter, and then (but only then) matter fabricate mind which fabricate matter etc. I solve the logical initial condition problem.

Put it in another way it is like Maxwell would say that the factorial function is given by the rule

Factorial(n) = n*factorial(n-1)

Where I say:

factorial(n) =  IF n = 0 THEN 1, ELSE (but only else)  n*factorial(n-1).

To sum up very shortly: I say numbers fabricate the mind matter dissociation, including all tergiversation's

To sum up less shortly: I say numbers fabricate the web of numbers dreams, which are just the possible computations as seen from some internal (first person) view. Then incompleteness constraints can justify how and why stable and coherent computations emerges which make *us* capable of sharing partially some deep dream (making solipsism false as Stephen rightly insist it should be so). (or perhaps *not* but I would take that as a refutation of comp)

Regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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