> Le 02-juin-05, à 15:23, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> > [Stathis wrote]
> >> So if I am told that tomorrow I will be copied ten times and
> >> one of these copies will be tortured, I am worried, because
> >> that means there is a 1/10 chance I will be tortured.
> > Good example, but I would say that you will be tortured with
> > 100% probability at some places, and tortured with 0% probability
> > at nine others. The characterization of a piece of matter "Stathis
> > is undergoing torture" is looked upon from the 3rd person as an
> > entirely physically characterized objective process.
> But here I agree with Stathis. What you say can be said with the throw
> of a dice. There *will be* a 100% probability that I will experience
> the result n (with n = 1, 2, ...6). And if I make the dice rolling a
> long time, by adding the Heisenberg uncertainties there will be (with
> the MWI) a 100% probability for each outcome. But before the experience
> I am in a maximal state of ignorance, and that gives usually P = 1/6.
Well, it *sounds* like you are agreeing with me, or rather, with
the idea that you will experience each outcome of the roll of the
dice. Let's be specific: you have agreed that on your 60th birthday
you will attend a large celebration in your honor, and will roll
a massive osmium die, amid cheers from all those assembled.
This is the only time that such money and effort will be expended
for the "Great Bruno Osmium Die Roll" (except for incidents of
extremely low measure elsewhere in the multiverse where aliens
intervene or God appears to demand it, etc.) The entire purpose
of my hypothesis here, is just so that we do not confuse this
particular roll of the die with any other of your life.
I agree: *you* will experience *each* outcome of the Die Roll.
You will even experience the event that the osmium die turns
into a cloud of dust (through a quantum fluctuation), but it's
key that this occurs with only infinitesimal measure compared
to the measures of the six Brunos who experience the usual 1..6
So aren't we in total agreement so far? If so, then I suggest that
the usual nuances and feelings associated with the phrase "there is
a 1/6 probability that I will experience n=3 (the Die shows a three)"
is highly misleading! It makes one think that something *could*
happen to one, but that in certain cases it does *not* happen to one.
The problem is actually one of *anticipation*. As naturally evolved
creatures, we are fashioned to anticipate the next moments. I have no
time now to get into it, but I don't think that this feeling of
anticipation really can be rigorously used; it's (unfortunately)
riddled with problems. Yet we are wired to observe it. So before
the great Die roll, you must anticipate seeing 1..6 and *not*
seeing the quantum fluctuation. Moreover, if one of the normal
six outcomes is associated with a very unpleasant experience,
you cannot help but think that it's similar to having a one in
six chance of the bad thing happening, and a 5 in 6 chance of
it not happening. But I think that's a lie: the truth is that
each outcome *will* happen. The only thing that gives you any
consolation is that the measure of the bad thing is only 1/6
while the measure of the good things is 5/6.
> I agree "it is you", but I follow Stathis' intuition that before the
> "splitting" the proba is 1/10 of being "that "you"".
While, on the other hand, I speak this way: you definitely will be
that "you", and you definitely will not be that "you". Both will
happen; it's not best to speak of it as a probability IMO.
> If not with comp you must accept that Bruno Marchal *is* Lee Corbin.
> I think we did arrive at that conclusion before, [didn't we]?
I would say that Bruno and Lee are not the same because they have
very different memories (and, also---I think it follows---different
kinds of OMs). Now if as one poster pointed out, I live long enough
(e.g. 10^10^10^10^10) then the state *I* will have will be one of
Bruno's. But so what? All that means is that Lee won't be there
and Bruno will be there. It's similarity of structure that matters:
that's why I must identify with the Lee of last month, but not
necessarily the Lee of 2025 (especially if he's been drafted into
the Army and gets really, really different kinds of experience).
> Suppose immortality (for the sake of the argument). Lee1 and Lee2 can
> become as different as Bruno and Lee now.
> I think you should consider me as a "you" right now. We were the same
> amoeba you know, a long time ago.
As I am saying, there is no "soul" or other divinely registered
serial number. The paths that Lee1 and Lee2 take could take them
clear out of the Lee Corbin fuzzy sphere in personality-space.
In which case *I* am completely not getting runtime from their
The only reason I resist considering you (Bruno) to be Lee, is that
over in Bruno, "I" have so many different memories and dispositions
that I'm not Lee any more.