Lee Corbin writes:

Stathis writes

> ...I think we may basically agree, but there are some differences. If you > look at it from a third person perspective, continuity of personal identity
> over time is not only a delusion but a rather strange and inconsistent
> delusion.

I'm not quite sure I understand why you say this.  Do you only
mean that *continuity* can be manipulated, e.g., on the one hand
we suffer a discontinuity every night when we fall asleep;  on
the other, in the future it will be possible to record your
Monday experience, your Tuesday experience, etc., and then
a few months later play them back in reverse sequence? (We might
even give the latter replays tremendous measure, so that so far
as the parameter *time* is concerned, almost all of your Mondays
occurred after your Wednesdays.

Or do you mean more?

The OM's are straightforward empirical observation: "I'm now having the experience of typing this sentence". How this experience comes about, whether there really is a physical keyboard in front of me, and so on, may be in question, but not the fact that I am having the experience. Stringing the OM's together to construct an individual who persists through time, however, is not straightforward:

I believe that tomorrow I will become one of the people in the multiverse who believe they are me and share my memories. When I think about this, I hope that my future selves will have good experiences, and I fear that they might have bad experiences. Once tomorrow comes, I no longer care about the other versions, because they aren't me even though they think they are me. Looking back, also, I believe that I was only one of the possible versions in the multiverse, and I no longer care about bad experiences that person might have had in the same way that I care about bad experiences I am having at present or one of the versions of me might have in the future.

We normally take all this for granted, but if you think about it, it is quite arbitrary. Why should I believe I will "become" another person who thinks he is me? Why should I identify with multiple versions of me in the future, but not the present or the past? Why should I worry about what might happen to my future self but not my past self? The answer is, because that is the way human minds have evolved. But that is the only reason. It would be no logical contradiction to imagine a person whose mind functioned very differently; for example, a person who had no fear of the future because he considered the idea absurd that he could "become" someone with different spacetime coordinates to his present ones.

It is the failure to take into account this rather complex scheme we use to create individuals that leads to mistakes in the application of OM measure, for example in criticising the QTI.

I still feel that there is a 10%
> chance I will be tortured, and I still feel relieved that I am one of the
> lucky copies when tomorrow comes and I am not tortured. There is an
> inconsistency here in that today I identify with all the copies and tomorrow
> I identify with only one, but so what? As you say, that is how our minds
> have evolved.


> If the experiences of the copy who is to be tortured will eventually be
> merged with those of the non-tortured copies, that changes the situation,
> because then it is *guaranteed* that I will eventually experience the
> torture.

Good point. To be precise let's say that tomorrow you will split into
the ten copies, one of which will be tortured. Then one *year* from
now merging is scheduled to occur. Therefore you behave differently?
I don't think you should.  (You may *have* to because that's how we
are built, but you still shouldn't.)

Given this information before the split occurs, it makes it more likely that I will experience torture: the 1/10 chance initially, then the certainty of merging in a year - although the merging may result in memory of the torture rather than the first hand experience.

As I like to say "just because you are not (locally) experiencing
something, doesn't mean it isn't happening to you". Suppose that
you don't know whether any merging is to ever happen. How should
that change the way you feel about your copy being tortured? Now,
I grant that you don't get the sweaty palms if there won't be
any merging, but to me that's just a base animalistic reflex action.
The truth is that *you* are in two places at the same time, and in
the other place you are hurting a lot.

The point is that *now* your duplicate is in pain. For purely
selfish reasons, this should be a big deal to you, I contend.
Whether or not eons from now some merging does or does not
take place shouldn't change your approval or disapproval of
physical events taking place now.

I have to disagree with you here. Why should I care about the suffering of some guy in another universe who thinks he is me, and whom I can never meet? I would be more concerned about the suffering of strangers in third world countries in my own universe.

> I would worry similarly if I were to inherit the experiences of any
> unrelated third person; the fact that it is other copies of me who are
> suffering does not in itself make any selfish difference.

Two points. First, if it's an "unrelated third person", it becomes
very unclear what merging would mean. We ran into a little of that
with trying to obtain memories of having been a bat.

The recording of actual feelings so that the person playing them back through some kind of neural interface experiences the feeling as if first hand is a common device in science fiction, and may well become a reality one day.

Second, I don't think that the sudden acquisition of memories is
nearly as big a deal as the actual, first-time-though gaining of
an experience. I would vastly rather be given the memories of
having been tortured than to actually experience it (and retain
the memory).  (Some very nice thought experiments obtain when
one plays off experience vs. memory-acquisition.)


--Stathis Papaioannou

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