Jonathan Colvin writes:

That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of ourselves
getting hurt than a complete stranger?

I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than my copy,
but only, I think, because I would have more empathy for my copy than for a
stranger, in the same way that I would have more empathy for my mother
getting stuck than I would for someone I don't know.

Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any convincing argument for
favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we were
copied and started diverging.

Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I would necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than to a stranger. After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details, my passwords... it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter enemies.

The situation is different when I am considering my copies in the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because that means there is 1/2 chance that I will "become" the torture victim. When tomorrow comes and I am not the torture victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel sorry for my suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You could argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is inconsistent or irrational is beside the point: this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are being "irrational" because there is no limb there in reality, but knowing this does not make the pain go away.

--Stathis Papaioannou

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