>>Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument 
>>for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after 
>all, *me* 
>>(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we 
>>were copied and started diverging.
>
>Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I 
>would necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than 
>to a stranger. 
>After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details, 
>my passwords... 
>it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter enemies.
>
>The situation is different when I am considering my copies in 
>the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two 
>copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because 
>that means there is 1/2 chance that I will "become" the 
>torture victim. When tomorrow comes and I am not the torture 
>victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel sorry for my 
>suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You could 
>argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify 
>with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is 
>inconsistent or irrational is beside the point: 
>this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who 
>experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are being 
>"irrational" because there is no limb there in reality, but 
>knowing this does not make the pain go away.

This is incorrect, I think. At time A, pre-split, there is a 100% chance
that you will *become* the torture victim. The torture victim must have once
been you, and thus you must become the torture victim with probability 1.
There's no inconsistency here; you are quite right to be worried at time A,
because you (at time A) *will* be tortured (at time B). The inconsistency
comes with identifying (you at time A, pre-split) with (one of the you's at
time B, post-split). There can be no one-to-one correspondence.

Jonathan Colvin

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