> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:16 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; firstname.lastname@example.org
> Subject: RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
> Jonathan Colvin writes:
> [quoting Stathis Papaioannou]:
> > >The situation is different when I am considering my copies in the
> > >future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two
> copies, one of
> > >whom will be tortured, I am worried, because that means
> there is 1/2
> > >chance that I will "become" the torture victim. When
> tomorrow comes
> > >and I am not the torture victim, I am relieved, because now I can
> > >feel sorry for my suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a
> > >stranger. You could argue that there is an inconsistency
> here: today
> > >I identify with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But
> whether it
> > >is inconsistent or irrational is beside the point:
> > >this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who experiences
> > >phantom limb pain is aware that they are being
> "irrational" because
> > >there is no limb there in reality, but knowing this does
> not make the
> > >pain go away.
> >This is incorrect, I think. At time A, pre-split, there is a 100%
> >chance that you will *become* the torture victim. The torture victim
> >must have once been you, and thus you must become the torture victim
> >with probability 1.
> >There's no inconsistency here; you are quite right to be worried at
> >time A, because you (at time A) *will* be tortured (at time B). The
> >inconsistency comes with identifying (you at time A, pre-split) with
> >(one of the you's at time B, post-split). There can be no
> one-to-one correspondence.
> You are right to say that I will definitely become the
> torture victim, insofaras there will definitely be a torture
> victim and he will have been me pre-split. However, what I am
> interested in is the *apparent* probability that I will be
> tortured, however that may come about. Here is another
> example. You are offered two choices:
> (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads,
> you will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
> (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the copies
> will be tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured.
> By your reasoning, there is a 50% chance you will be tortured
> in (a) and a 100% chance you will be tortured in (b), so (a)
> is better. But I would say the probabilities are (a) 50% and
> (b) 10%, so (b) is clearly the better choice.
Hmmmm...I'd disagree. Emotionally, (a) feels the better choice to me; in (b)
I'm definitely getting tortured, in (a) I may dodge the bullet. On a purely
objective basis (attempting to mimimize the amount of torture in the world),
(a) is also obviously superior.
This would make an interesting poll. Who prefers (a) over (b)?