Le 08-juin-05, à 21:54, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :

Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument
for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
were copied and started diverging.

Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I
would necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than
to a stranger.
After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details,
my passwords...
it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter enemies.

The situation is different when I am considering my copies in
the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two
copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because
that means there is 1/2 chance that I will "become" the
torture victim. When tomorrow comes and I am not the torture
victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel sorry for my
suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You could
argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify
with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is
inconsistent or irrational is beside the point:
this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who
experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are being
"irrational" because there is no limb there in reality, but
knowing this does not make the pain go away.

This is incorrect, I think. At time A, pre-split, there is a 100% chance that you will *become* the torture victim. The torture victim must have once been you, and thus you must become the torture victim with probability 1. There's no inconsistency here; you are quite right to be worried at time A, because you (at time A) *will* be tortured (at time B). The inconsistency comes with identifying (you at time A, pre-split) with (one of the you's at
time B, post-split). There can be no one-to-one correspondence.

To sum up I am duplicated, and one of the copy will be tortured, the other will not be tortured. You say that there is 100% chance I will be tortured. If we interview the one who is not tortured he must acknowledge his reasoning was false, and the proba could not have been = to 100% chance. Are you not identifying yourself with the one who will be tortured (in this case you make the error you pretend Stathis is doing. If not, it means you identified yourself with both, but this would mean you do the confusion between 1 and 3 person, given that we cannot *feel* to be two different individuals.



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