Le 09-juin-05, à 01:19, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :

I don't believe in observers, if by "observer" one means to assignspecialontological status to mental states over any other arrangement ofmatter.

`I don't believe in matters, if by "matters" one means to assign special`

`ontological status to some substance, by which it is mean (Aristotle)`

`anything entirely determined by its parts.`

This is similar to the objection to the classic interpretation of QM,whereby an "observation" is required to collapse the WF (how do youdefine"observer"?..a rock?..a chicken?..a person?).

`Yes, but Everett did succeed his explanation of the apparent collapse`

`by defining an observer by "just" classical memory machine.`

But this was in response to a comment that "it was time to get seriousaboutobserver-moments". An observer is such a poorly defined and nebulousthingthat I don't think one can get serious about it.

`My definition is that an observer is a universal (Turing) machine. With`

`Church's thesis we can drop the "Turing" qualification.`

`Actually an observer is a little more. It is a sufficiently "rich"`

`universal machine.`

`To be utterly precise (like in my thesis) an observer is a lobian`

`machine, by which I mean any machine which is able to prove "ExP(x) ->`

`Provable("ExP(x))" for any decidable predicate P(x). ExP(x) means`

`there is a natural number x such that P(x), and "provable" is the`

`provability predicate studied by Godel, Lob and many others.`

`But then I need to explain more on the provability logic to explain the`

`nuances between the scientist machine, the knowing machine, the`

`observing machine, etc. You can look at my sane paper for an overview.`

I'd note that your definition is close to being circular.."an observer is somethingsufficiently similar to me that I might think I could have been it".But howdo we decide what is "sufficient"? The qualities you list(consciousness,perception etc) are themselves poorly defined or undefinable.

`Consciousness can be considered as a first person view of the result of`

`an automatic bet on the existence of a model (in the logician sense) of`

`oneself. From this we can explain why "consciousness" is not`

`representable in the language of a machine. And consciousness get a`

`role: self-speeding up oneself relatively to our most probable`

`computational histories.`

It should develop in all self-moving mechanical entity.

`I define variant of "first person view" by applying Theaetetus'`

`definition of knowledge (and "popperian" variants) on the Godel`

`self-referential provability predicate.`

Perhaps you could try to tell me what do you mean by "matter?" Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/