> > I don't believe in observers, if by "observer" one means to assign
> > special ontological status to mental states over any other
> > of matter.
> I don't believe in matters, if by "matters" one means to
> assign special ontological status to some substance, by which
> it is mean (Aristotle) anything entirely determined by its parts.
Hehe, the usual response to idealism is to drop a rock onto the propounder's
finger, and then ask them if they still do not believe in material objects.
> > This is similar to the objection to the classic
> interpretation of QM,
> > whereby an "observation" is required to collapse the WF (how do you
> > define "observer"?..a rock?..a chicken?..a person?).
> Yes, but Everett did succeed his explanation of the apparent collapse
> by defining an observer by "just" classical memory machine.
But the point is that observation is not central to Everett's theory at all;
observation is wholly peripheral, and is only discussed insofar as why it
*appears* that a collapse happens.
> Perhaps you could try to tell me what do you mean by "matter?"
Something that kicks back (has an effect on the universe). Note that this
excludes "epiphenomena" such as qualia or some interpretions of
consciousness, since it appears that the universe would keep running exactly
the same way without them.