Le 09-juin-05, à 23:00, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :

Bruno wrote:
I don't believe in observers, if by "observer" one means to assign
special ontological status to mental states over any other
arrangement
of matter.

I don't believe in matters, if by "matters" one means to
assign special ontological status to some substance, by which
it is mean (Aristotle) anything entirely determined by its parts.

Hehe, the usual response to idealism is to drop a rock onto the propounder's finger, and then ask them if they still do not believe in material objects.


And the usual answer of the idealist is that they dream sometimes on rock dropped on their fingers. That proves nothing. With comp you can invoke the matrix or Galouye's Simulacron III.




This is similar to the objection to the classic
interpretation of QM,
whereby an "observation" is required to collapse the WF (how do you
define "observer"?..a rock?..a chicken?..a person?).


Yes, but Everett did succeed his explanation of the apparent collapse
by defining an observer by "just"  classical memory machine.

But the point is that observation is not central to Everett's theory at all; observation is wholly peripheral, and is only discussed insofar as why it
*appears* that a collapse happens.


I have argued at length that this is a weak point in Everett. The idea is that once you postulate comp like Everett does, then you need to explain why you take only the quantum computation into account.





<snip>

Perhaps you could try to tell me what do you mean by "matter?"

Something that kicks back (has an effect on the universe).


I don't take the word "universe" as granted, still less physicalist type of universe. Actually I search an explanation of just that. With comp, my point is that universe emerges from all (immaterial, mathematical) computations. Arithmetical truth alone can be shown to be a vast "video game" or simulacron ... Perhaps you could study a little bit of theoretical computer science. They are many conuter-intuitive results which could help to think that what I say is at least pausible.


Note that this
excludes "epiphenomena" such as qualia or some interpretions of
consciousness, since it appears that the universe would keep running exactly
the same way without them.


All what I say is that if you are right on this point, then comp is false. (Or there is an error in my thesis, but this I am always assuming by default).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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