Le 13-juin-05, à 15:39, Jesse Mazer a écrit :

Bruno Marchal:

To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and x' from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x, involves a 'white rabbit events'.

It's not completely separable, but I'd think that "similarity" would mostly be a function of memories, personality, etc...even if I experience something very weird, I can still have basically the same mind. For example, a hoaxer could create a realistic animatronic talking white rabbit, and temporarily I might experience an observer-moment identical to what I'd experience if I saw a genuine white talking rabbit, so the "similarity" between my current experience and what I'd experience in a white rabbit universe would be the same as the "similarity" between my current experience and what I'd experience in a universe where someone creates a realistic hoax. I don't think the first-person probabilities of experiencing hoaxes are somehow kept lower than what you'd expect from a third-person perspective, do you?

Perhaps I misunderstood you, but it seems to me, that in case you ask me to compute P(x -> y) (your notation), it could and even should change that prediction result. In particular if the rabbit has been generated by a genuine hoaxer I would predict the white rabbit will stay in y, and if the hoaxer is not genuine, then I would still consider x and x' as rather very dissimilar. What do you think? This follows *also* from a relativisation of Hall Finney's theory based on kolmogorov complexity: a stable white rabbit is expensive in information resource. No?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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