Le 13-juin-05, à 21:06, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> If you impose the condition I discussed earlier that absolute
> don't change over time, or in terms of my analogy, that the water
> each tank don't change because the total inflow rate to each tank
> matches the total outflow rate, then I don't think it's possible to
> sense of the notion that the observer-moments in that torture-free
> would have 10^100 times greater absolute measure. If there's 10^100
> more water in the tanks corresponding to OMs during that minute,
> all this water go after the tank corresponding to the last OM in
> minute, and where is it flowing in from to the tank corresponding
> first OM in this minute?
I would propose to implement the effect by duplicating the guy 10^100
during that minute, then terminating all the duplicates after that
What happens in your model when someone dies in some fraction of the
multiverse? His absolute measure decreases, but where does the
In my model, death only exists from a third-person perspective, but
from a first-person perspective I'm subscribing to the QTI, so
consciousness will always continue in some form (even if my memories
don't last or I am reduced to an amoeba-level consciousness)--the
"water molecules" are never created or destroyed.
I agree. This is even related with my "NO KESTRELS, NO STARLINGS" rough
summary of physics (see the end of my first combinators post "the
chemistry of combinators:
I intend to come back on this.
For what would happen when an observer is duplicated from a
third-person perspective, it might help to consider the example I
discussed on the '"Last-minute" vs. "anticipatory" quantum
immortality' thread at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4841.html , where a person is
initially duplicated before a presidential election, and then
depending on the results of the election, one duplicate is later
copied 999 times. All else being equal, I'd speculate that the initial
2-split would "anticipate" the later 999-split, so that 999 out of
1000 "water molecules" of the first observer would split off into the
copy that is later going to be split 999 times, so before this second
split, OMs of this copy would have 999 times the absolute measure of
the copy that isn't going to be split again.
I essentially agree. Stathis should not agree, or I have misunderstood
Stathis on its last posts. Correct me perhaps.
I'm not absolutely sure that this would be a consequence of the idea
about finding a unique self-consistent set of absolute and conditional
probabilities based only on a "similarity matrix" and the condition of
absolute probabilities not changing with time, but it seems intuitive
to me that it would.
I agree except question of vocabulary. It's not important (at this
At some point I'm going to try to test this idea with mathematica or
something, creating a finite set of OMs and deciding what the possible
successors to each one are in order to construct something like a
"similarity matrix", then finding the unique vector of absolute
probabilities that, when multiplied by this matrix, gives a unit
vector (the procedure I discussed in my last post to you at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m6855.html ). Hopefully the
absolute probabilities would indeed tend to "anticipate" future splits
in the way I'm describing.
Nice test. I'm curious to see the result. Not sure there is a unique
vector. Not sure it is important that there is one. I may be wrong.
So if this anticipatory idea works, then any copy that's very unlikely
to survive long from a third-person perspective is going to undergoe
fewer future splits from a multiverse perspective (there will always
be few branches where this copy survives though), so your conditional
probability of becoming such a copy would be low, meaning that not
much of your "water" would flow into that copy, and it will have a
smaller absolute measure than copies that are likely to survive in
Let us see ...