Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>    Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of 
>>>dualism require that one side of the duality has properties and 
>>>behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of the duality, 
>>>as examplified by the idea of "randomly emplaced souls"?
>>>    The idea that all dualities, of say mind and body, allow that 
>>>minds and bodies can have properties and behaviours that are not 
>>>mutually constrained is, at best, an incoherent straw dog.
>> (JC) I don't really uderstand the question the way you've phrased it (I'm

>> not sure what you mean by "mutually constrained"); I *think* you are 
>> asking whether I believe that it is necessary that any duality must 
>> have mutually exclusive properties (if not, please elaborate).
> [SPK]
>    The same kind of mutual constraint that exist between a 
>given physical object, say a IBM z990 or a 1972 Jaguar XKE or 
>the human Stephen Paul King, and the possible complete 
>descriptions of such. It is upon this distiction betwen 
>physical object and its representations, or equivalently, 
>between a complete description and its possible 
>implementations, that the duality that I argue for is based. 
>This is very different from the Cartesian duality of 
>"substances" (res extensa and res cognitas) that are seperate 
>and independent and yet mysteriously linked.

I'm not sure what a "complete description" is. Are we talking about a
dualism between, say, a perfect blueprint of a skyscraper and a skyscraper?
I'm not sure I'd call that equation a dualism at all. I'd call it a category
error. A description of a falling skyscraper can not hurt you (unless you
are also a description ... I agree with Bruno here), whereas a falling
skyscraper can. But please elaborate.

Jonathan Colvin

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